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"MY GOD!": A Feminist Critique of 
the Excited Utterance Exception to the 
Hearsay Rule 
Aviva Orenstein 
The excited utterance exception admits hearsay statements made 
while the declarant was under the stress or excitement of a particularly 
startling event, on the theory that such stress or excitement precludes the 
kind of reflection necessary for the declarant to fabricate, and hence 
renders such out-of-court statements sufficiently reliable. The excited 
utterance exception has long been subjected to a psychological critique, 
which questions the wisdom of a doctrine that relies on the stress of the 
declarant. This criticism claims that stress and excitement are as likely 
to cloud perception and memory as they are to ensure truthfulness. The 
author applies the insights of both the difference and dominance 
schools of feminist jurisprudence to explain the longevity and cultural 
appeal of the doctrine in the face of such challenges. She criticizes the 
existing excited utterance exception on the ground that it betrays a mas- 
culine bias, privileging the accustomed responses to stress of empowered 
persons over those of women and other disadvantaged groups. The ex- 
cited utterance exception ignores the experiences of people who deviate 
from the rule's paradigm of how "normal" people react to stress, and 
thereby subtly perpetuates a cultural and legal image of women as un- 
reliable. In particular, the Article focuses on the inconsistency between 
the doctrinal demands of the excited utterance and women's docu- 
mented reactions to rape. In requiring a prompt statement and visible 
signs of distress, the excited utterance exception simply does not reflect 
the reported experiences of many rape survivors who often are too diso- 
riented, numb, afraid, or ashamed to issue a prompt statement, excited 
or otherwise. Instead, the excited utterance exception seems to describe 
best those who are sufficiently confident of their power to emit a prompt 
excited cry, and who expect that their cries will be taken seriously. In 
response, the author proposes a modification of the excited utterance 
exception, and an additional exception that would allow out-of-court 
statements by survivors of sexual violence even when made well after the 
attack itself The author incorporates safeguards to protect the rights of 
criminal defendants when such statements are to be introduced. 
162 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:159 
INTRODUCTION 
Evidence law is ideally suited for feminist analysis. This area of 
law regulates and reflects the construction of courtroom "truth." It 
perpetuates the cultural values, legal rules, and social norms that our so- 
ciety uses to assess credibility.' On a more practical, doctrinal level, evi- 
dence law controls who will be heard. Essentially, evidence law governs 
how legal stories are presented and influences which stories are believed. 
Feminist method offers a fascinating perspective on evidence law, 
because feminism, like evidence, is concerned with how stories are heard 
and how society determines credibility. Feminist method seeks to un- 
cover unconscious assumptions embedded in law and to examine how 
purportedly neutral rules may discriminate against women.2 This 
method also facilitates examination of the often unarticulated theories 
of relevance and reliability underlying evidence law. 
This Article uses a feminist method to analyze the excited utterance 
doctrine, a codified exception to the hearsay rule in evidence law.3 In 
particular, the Article explores how the practical effects of the doctrine 
can be devastating for prosecutions of rape and other sexual crimes. 
The current limitations of the excited utterance exception sharply curtail 
1. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE 
CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 2 (1991) 
(explaining that evidence law reflects "the culture's general understanding of how we 'know' things 
to be true"). 
2. As feminist methods for examining law have developed, scholars have increasingly focused 
feminist critiques on purportedly "neutral" areas of law. Various traditional legal disciplines such as 
torts and civil procedure have joined family law, rape, and sexual harassment as topics of feminist 
concern. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL . REV. 
575 (1993); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991) (examining the roles of women in federal court and the role of gender 
in federal jurisdiction); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U. CIN. L 
REV. 1223, 1223 n.3, 1224 nn.4 & 6, 1231-32 (1993) (listing articles about feminism and procedure 
and noting that "feminist concern with process can assist us to explore a richer, more focused, 
complex and contextual analysis of the role of process"). 
Initial groundwork has been laid in applying feminism to evidence law generally. See Aviva 
Orenstein, Feminism & Evidence, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, WOMEN AND THE LAW: CRITICAL 
ESSAYS, RESEARCH AGENDA AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (Sharon Rush et al. eds., forthcoming 1997) 
(exploring possible connections between feminism and evidence); Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, 
the Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories From the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 914 (1994) (reviewing evidence casebooks for gender bias); Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: 
Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127 (1996) (analyzing the effects of 
gender on questions of credibility and relevance); Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 413 (explaining ways evidence law might learn from feminist jurisprudence); Marilyn 
MacCrimmon, The Social Construction of Reality and the Rules of Evidence, 25 U. BRIT. COLUM. L 
REV. 36 (1991). 
3. The excited utterance exception admits out-of-court statements "relating to a startling event 
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition." FED. R. EvID. 803(2). These statements are substantive vidence admitted for the truth 
of the matter asserted by the declarant. The declarant need not testify, even though she is available 
as a witness. FED. R. EVID. 803. 
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the chances for survivors of rape or other sexual violence to tell their 
stories truthfully, completely, and in their own words. By requiring a 
prompt utterance and visible signs of distress, the excited utterance ex- 
ception fails to reflect the reported experiences of rape survivors, who 
often are too disoriented, numb, afraid, or ashamed to issue a prompt 
statement, excited or otherwise. 
In charting the misfit between the doctrine and the reported experi- 
ences of women subjected to rape and other sexual violence, the Article 
examines how the excited utterance doctrine may perpetuate a legal and 
cultural image of women as unreliable. To remedy this disjuncture be- 
tween the excited utterance exception and the experiences of sexual 
violence survivors, the Article proposes a new hearsay exception tar- 
geted to survivors of sexual violence. 
Part I of this Article describes the hearsay rule and its traditional 
rationale. Part II traces the doctrinal history of the excited utterance 
exception, which admits out-of-court statements concerning a startling 
event made while the declarant is still under the stress of the event. Part 
II also summarizes the standard psychological critique of the excited 
utterance exception. This critique postulates that the declarant's stress, a 
necessary element of the excited utterance exception, may distort the 
declarant's perception and memory, thereby diminishing the declar- 
ant's reliability and discrediting the rationale of the excited utterance 
doctrine. 
The Article next develops and applies a feminist analysis to the ex- 
cited utterance exception. Part III draws on two strands of feminism, 
difference and dominance feminism. Applying theories from these two 
schools of feminism, the Article assails the structure and philosophy of 
the hearsay rule, concluding that it both reinforces hierarchical relations 
in the courtroom and disfavors certain speakers and styles of communi- 
cation. Specifically, Part III argues that the hearsay ban tends to ex- 
clude women's styles of communication, which have traditionally 
emphasized informality and privacy. Despite this criticism, however, the 
Article does not advocate eliminating the hearsay rule, because of con- 
cern for the rights of criminal defendants, particularly the right to con- 
front witnesses. 
Part IV subjects the excited utterance exception to a feminist cri- 
tique in the context of survivors of rape and other sexual violence. In 
particular, the Article focuses on the disjuncture between the doctrinal 
demands of the excited utterance exception-an excited cry issued near 
the time of the startling event-and women's documented reactions to 
rape and other sexual violence. This problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that although courts are unpredictable in their determinations of the 
timing requirements for admissibility of excited utterances, many will 
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often exclude survivors' statements if they do not fall within narrow 
time constraints. The strict adherence to timing requirements is par- 
ticularly troubling where the excited utterer is unavailable because she 
was killed or intimidated by her attacker. Even where the survivor is 
available to testify, however, the excited utterance rule is problematic, 
excluding hearsay statements that may provide increased information 
and context, particularly where the survivor is traumatized, embarrassed, 
or is otherwise a reticent witness. 
Part IV argues that the excited utterance exception stems from 
overly narrow and gendered assumptions of how "normal" people re- 
act to stress. Additionally, the Article observes that the cultural stereo- 
types embedded in the excited utterance doctrine reflect the experience 
and world view of those who possess power, and who, by extension, are 
confident enough to emit a prompt excited cry and expect it to be taken 
seriously. The excited utterance doctrine excludes certain reliable but 
less powerful speakers, thereby contributing to a legal climate that dis- 
credits, among others, many women.4 
To remedy the underinclusive nature of the excited utterance ex- 
ception, Part V proposes a new hearsay exception that targets survivors 
of sexual violence.5 The proposal would apply to all survivors of sexual 
crimes, not just women. Because of trauma, fear, lack of power, shame, 
or even reticent conversational style, such survivors may not make 
prompt statements or exhibit external, culturally recognized signs of 
stress. For this reason, the proposal would admit extra-judicial state- 
ments made by survivors into evidence without regard to the length of 
delay between the traumatic event and the survivor's statement. Addi- 
tionally, the proposal eliminates the requirement that the speaker mani- 
fest or experience stress when making the utterance. 
4. This theory extends to other disempowered groups and therefore calls for further 
scholarship and exploration of this effect. See infra Part IV.E (calling for extension of the excited 
utterance doctrine). 
5. This Article uses the term "survivor" rather than "victim" to refer to someone who has 
experienced sexual violence. This choice reflects an attempt to avoid the stigma of victimization and 
to honor the people who survive the ordeal of rape. See Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the 
Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1310-11 & 
n.115 (1992) (explaining that "survivor" has replaced "victim" in feminist vocabulary to refute the 
notion that the woman in rape and battering situations is passive); Evelyn Mary Aswad, Note, Torture 
by Means of Rape, 84 GEo. L.J. 1913, 1916 n.l11 (1996) (explaining the use of the term rape 
"survivor" to "eliminate the victim role") (quoting Metin Basoglu, Prevention of Torture and Care of 
Survivors, 270 JAMA 606, 606 (1993)). This terminology is not without its critics, who believe that 
avoidance of the term "victim" is unfair and may in some way blame women or ignore the feeling of 
being a victim. See, e.g., Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 308 
n.6 (1995) (using "the term rape 'survivor' reluctantly" because of respect for the feelings of 
victimization of people who have been raped). Unfortunately, this terminology becomes awkward 
when the rape "survivor" literally does not survive and dies of her rape-related injuries. 
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The proposed exception also reflects a concern for the rights of 
criminal defendants. It requires, where possible, that defendants be pre- 
sented with an opportunity to cross examine declarants of excited utter- 
ances or survivors' statements. Where the declarant is unavailable, the 
proposal requires a particularized showing of trustworthiness. These 
and other safeguards guarantee that the interests of criminal defendants 
will not be sacrificed in fashioning a hearsay exception that acknowl- 
edges and includes the experience of women and other survivors of sex- 
related crimes. 
I 
THE TRADITIONAL DEFINITION AND DEFENSE OF THE 
HEARSAY RULE 
The hearsay rule provides that out-of-court statements may not be 
used for the truth of the matter asserted.6 A party cannot introduce a 
statement made outside the trial to persuade the trier of fact that the 
statement is substantively true.7 
The most prevalent modern theory explaining the hearsay rule 
holds that the rules of evidence in general, and hearsay in particular, 
track the development of the jury system. Over time, the jury has 
shifted from a group of neighbors with personal knowledge of the 
events at issue to an impartial fact-finding group that relies on party- 
generated evidence.8 A combination of paternalism and distrust of ju- 
rors prompted courts to exclude from the jury's consideration catego- 
ries of evidence deemed unreliable.' The most important exclusion was 
6. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 n.4 (1980) (relying on McCormick's definition of 
hearsay as "testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement 
being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its 
value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter"). 
7. The hearsay rule presents many puzzles. The first, and arguably hardest, intellectual step is 
to identify hearsay. For instance, courts and scholars have pondered the nature of an out-of-court 
"statement" and whether assertions must be intentional. See, e.g., Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them 
Anything About You": Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. 
L. REV. 783 (1990) (examining treatment of implied assertions under modem caselaw); Glen 
Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule 803(3), 64 TEMP. L. REV. 145 
(1991); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE ?? 244, 246 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) 
[hereinafter McCORMICK]. 
8. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 244 (discussing the relationship between the development 
of the jury and hearsay law); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 
AT THE COMMON LAW 519 (1898). See generally John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to 
Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 203-12 
(1988). 
9. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 293 (1988) 
(disagreeing with the "long-prevailing jury distrust model of evidence law"); id. at 229-30; Roger 
Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 60 n.37 (1987) 
("[B]ecause of distrust of juries-a belief that jurors lack the competence to make allowance for the 
second-hand character of hearsay-such evidence, although accepted by administrative agencies, 
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hearsay. Courts consider jurors too unsophisticated and gullible to 
weigh hearsay appropriately.' 
What is it about hearsay that can trigger a juror's irrationality or 
poor judgment? Traditionally, evidence law excluded hearsay because 
it lacked the following characteristics: assurances of reliability stem- 
ming from an in-court oath," the ability of the factfinder to observe 
witness demeanor,12 the possibility of prosecution of the declarant for 
perjury, and, most importantly, the opportunity for cross-examination.'3 
For instance, imagine that an in-court witness wants to testify that 
an absent declarant, Dora, exclaimed near the scene of an accident, 
"The car ran the red light!" The hearsay rule requires Dora's direct 
testimony, rather than a report from another witness about what Dora 
said. Even if the witness to Dora's declaration were truthful in his re- 
juvenile courts and legislative committees, is (subject to be sure, to numerous exceptions) barred in 
jury trials.") (quoting J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 123 (1949)); L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness 
Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1425 n.210 (1995) (citing Jones on 
Evidence and THAYER, supra note 8 for the jury mistrust theory of hearsay); Eleanor Swift, 
Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 495, 496 n.2 (1987) (noting that "most commentators 
see the hearsay rule as a child of the jury, a tool for judicial protection against inaccurate 
factfinding"). 
10. A second theory, the "best evidence principle," has been recently revived by Professor 
Dale Nance. See Nance, supra note 9 (arguing that the overarching principle of evidence law is 
securing the best reasonably obtained evidence); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst 
Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1069 (1992) (rejecting the jury-focused approach and arguing that evidence law revolves 
around avoiding untrustworthy evidence and witnesses-the worst evidence-rather than 
affirmatively seeking the best evidence). 
11. There is debate about he efficacy of the oath in an age that has rejected divine retribution. 
Wigmore argued that the oath was non-essential, because out-of-court statements, even when sworn, 
were not admissible for their hearsay purpose. See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT THE COMMON LAW ? 1362 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1978). McCormick argues persuasively, 
however, that the oath has some vestigial impact by adding to the solemnity and majesty of the 
proceedings. See McCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 245. 
12. Evidence law encourages in-court testimony and disfavors out-of-court statements. See 
Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL . REV. 1075, 1076 (1991) (noting the law's 
preference for demeanor evidence, but questioning its effectiveness in determining whether a 
witness is lying). 
13. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913) (explaining that hearsay is 
generally unreliable because it lacks protections of oath, demeanor observation, and cross- 
examination). Lest this be the only evidence law review article in history to discuss cross- 
examination without trotting out Wigmore's famous dictum, here it is: Wigmore described cross- 
examination as "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 
WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1367, at 32. 
There are many other explanations for and reformulations of the hearsay rule aside from the 
traditional fretting over accuracy and concern for cross-examination. The hearsay rule must be 
understood, at least in part, as an outgrowth of the adversary system. For all the concerns about 
accuracy, reliability, and jury confusion, hearsay is almost entirely party driven. Generally, if the 
parties fail to object, the hearsay is in. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 245. 
In addition, the hearsay rule can be seen as a mechanism for preventing the government and 
large corporations from manufacturing reams of documents to deluge opponents who lack resources. 
See Park, supra note 9, at 65-66. 
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port,"4 information could get lost in the translation or repetition. Dora 
could have been joking or lying. Something could have obstructed her 
view. She could be colorblind. Too much time might have elapsed 
since the car passed for Dora to remember. The witness could have 
misheard Dora. These concerns regarding sincerity, narration, percep- 
tion, and memory form the core of the traditional preference for in- 
court testimony. 
Although these "hearsay dangers" are also present in live testi- 
mony, they are diminished by the availability of cross-examination. 
Cross-examination is designed to uncover weaknesses in Dora's ac- 
count. These weakness might be impossible to detect without Dora her- 
self, rather than a reporting hearsay witness, on the stand.15 
Of course, one cannot comprehend the scope of hearsay without 
inquiry into its many exceptions.16 What characteristics make evidence 
admitted pursuant to these exceptions preferable to requiring live, in- 
court testimony or to excluding the evidence altogether? Although 
there are various justifications for the different exceptions,"17 many hear- 
say exceptions are chiefly explained by the presumed trustworthiness of 
the statements they admit. The law of evidence has established catego- 
ries of statements for which the traditional concern with sincerity is off- 
set by some presumed guarantee of reliability. For instance, courts 
justify the declaration-against-interest exception because of its pur- 
ported reliability.'8 The declaration-against-interest exception admits 
out-of-court statements that are contrary to the speaker's pecuniary in- 
terest for the truth of the matter asserted. This exception arose from the 
14. This factor can be tested insofar as it is possible to detect lies and liars on cross- 
examination, because the reporting witness does testify in court. 
15. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 245 (discussing reasons for the rule against hearsay); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REv. 957, 958 (1974). 
16. The exceptions are so vast, they arguably swallow the rule, as Professor James Bradley 
Thayer wrote: 
But then comes the question, what is the rule, and what are the exceptions? There lies a 
difficulty. A true analysis would probably restate the law so as to make what we call the 
hearsay rule the exception, and make our main rule this, namely, that whatsoever is 
relevant is admissible. 
THAYER, supra note 8, at 522. Similarly, a more modern commentator has observed, "In the sea of 
admitted hearsay, the rule excluding hearsay is a small and lonely island." Jack B. Weinstein, 
Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331, 346 (1961); see I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, 
Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 
UTAH L. REv. 1, 7 (noting that "numerous exceptions largely subsume the general rule"). 
17. Justifications for exceptions include necessity, see, e.g., FED. R. EvID 801(d)(2)(E) 
(excepting from the hearsay rule co-conspirators' statements made during and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy), and the adversary system, see FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(A) (excepting personal 
admissions from the hearsay rule). Certainly, no coherent unifying theory explains the "crazy quilt" 
of hearsay exceptions. 
18. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). This hearsay exception can only be used if the declarant is 
unavailable to testify. Although I discuss declarations contrary to pecuniary interest, the exception is 
not limited to such interests. 
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presumption that people rarely make statements contrary to their finan- 
cial interest; therefore, such statements are particularly trustworthy. 
Similarly, the admissibility of an excited utterance is justified by 
the purported trustworthiness of such statements. The excited utterance 
exception relies on the theory that the nervous excitement experienced 
by the utterer leads to spontaneity, which in turn guarantees reliability. 
However, as the Part II.C demonstrates, many psychologists as well as 
legal scholars point to persuasive evidence that reliability does not in- 
variably follow from spontaneity, and that nervous excitement can lead 
to confusion and failure of perception. 
II 
THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION: NERVOUS AGITATION AS A 
GUARANTY OF SPONTANEITY, SINCERITY, AND RELIABILITY 
A. A History of the Doctrine 
The excited utterance exception derives from res gestae, which lit- 
erally means "things done" or "things happened."'9 Many modern 
evidence concepts have evolved from the concept of res gestae. Ac- 
cording to McCormick, courts began to employ the term in the early 
1800s to include spontaneous declarations that accompanied legally 
relevant acts.20 Res gestae includes elements that fall outside the modern 
hearsay definition altogether, such as circumstantial evidence of state of 
mind, so-called "verbal acts," verbal parts of acts, and certain non- 
verbal conduct. Because excited utterances are connected closely in 
time to the event and the excitement flows from the event, excited utter- 
ances were deemed part of the action (the "things done") and hence 
19. The concept refers to "words spoken, thoughts expressed, and gestures made.., .so closely 
connected to occurrence or event in both time and substance as to be a part of the happening." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990). Res gestae are the "automatic and undesigned 
incidents of the particular act in issue 
... 
." Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1937). Although 
courts still occasionally employ the term res gestae, it is for the most part a relic that served as a 
transitional device in the evolution of various hearsay exceptions. See McCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 268. 
Res gestae captured the interest and inspired the ire of many evidence greats. Sir Frederick 
Pollack called it a "damnable pretended doctrine." Letter from Sir Frederick Pollock to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Apr. 23, 1931), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 284 (Mark DeWolfe Howe 
ed., 2d ed. 1941). Edmund M. Morgan began his classic article, A Suggested Classification of 
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE LJ. 229 (1922), by noting that "[t]he marvelous 
capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning... [is] nowhere better illustrated 
than in the decisions dealing with the admissibility of evidence as 'res gestae."' Id. at 229. Learned 
Hand remarked, 
".. 
. as for 'res gestae,' it is a phrase which has been accountable for so much 
confusion that it had best be denied any place whatever in legal terminology; if it means anything but 
an unwillingness to think at all, what it covers cannot be put in less intelligible terms." United States v. 
Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944). 
20. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 268. These statements fall outside the hearsay definition 
because they do not demand that the factfinder believe that the statements are actually true, but only 
that they were made. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee's note. 
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admissible despite the hearsay rule. Res gestae also sired the hearsay 
exceptions for present-sense impressions, excited utterances, direct evi- 
dence of state of mind, and statements made to physicians.21 
The excited utterance exception provides that statements made un- 
der the influence of an exciting event while the speaker is still in a state 
of nervous excitement may be admitted for the truth of the matters they 
assert. This exception was isolated and promoted by John Henry Wig- 
more.22 In his multi-volume treatise on evidence, Wigmore developed in 
intricate detail what he termed the "spontaneous exclamation" excep- 
tion to hearsay, which we recognize today as the excited utterance ex- 
ception. According to Wigmore, a hearsay statement must meet the 
following criteria to qualify under this exception: (1) there must be a 
"startling occasion," (2) the out-of-court statement must be made be- 
fore the declarant has had time to "fabricate," and (3) the declarant's 
out-of-court statement must relate to the circumstances of the startling 
event.23 
Wigmore explained the policy of the exception as follows: 
This general principle is based on the experience that, under 
certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of 
nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective 
faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which 
then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual 
sensations and perceptions already produced by the external 
shock.24 
21. See Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has it Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial 
Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473, 475 (1992). 
22. See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 
I 803(2)[01][D], at 803-85 (discussing excited utterance exception and noting that it was "deducted 
initially by Wigmore"); James Donald Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of 
Res Gestae Reliability, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 203, 232 (1995) ("The exception for excited utterance 
may be traced directly to Wigmore's belief' that stress leads to sincerity.); Park, supra note 9, at 76 
n.100 (1987) (discussing how the doctrine of res gestae evolved "with Wigmore's help" into the 
excited utterance exception). 
23. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1750, at 202. The modern rule tracks all three requirements. 
See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2); infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
24. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1747, at 195. In another section, Wigmore similarly 
explained that "in the stress of nervous excitement he reflective faculties may be stilled and the 
utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of one's actual impressions and 
belief." Id. ? 1749, at 199. More modem scholarship has echoed this reasoning, noting that the 
exciting event "leaves the speaker momentarily incapable of fabrication, and his memory is fresh 
because the impression has not yet passed from his mind." CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE ? 8.35, at 1217 (1995) (noting that "[i]n short, risks of insincerity and 
memory lapse are removed"); see also GLEN WEISSENBERGER, F DERAL EVIDENCE ? 803.7, at 440 
(2d ed. 1995) ("Statements made in reaction to a startling stimulus are considered more trustworthy 
than hearsay generally on the dual grounds that, first, the stimulus renders the declarant incapable of 
fabrication and, second, the impression on the declarant's memory at the time of the statement is still 
fresh and intense."). 
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The witness' state of nervous tension was of utmost importance in 
Wigmore's analysis. According to Wigmore, this "immediate and un- 
controlled domination of the senses" lasts for a "brief period."25 
During this short time, neither thoughts of "self-interest" nor other 
"reasoned reflection" arise.26 Therefore, the utterance is "particularly 
trustworthy" and may be admitted despite its hearsay character.27 Wig- 
more even hinted that such evidence is superior to in-court testimony 
because of its spontaneity and closeness to the event.28 
Wigmore traced the excited utterance doctrine back to Thompson v. 
Trevanion, decided by Lord Holt in 1693.29 In Thompson, the court 
permitted the out-of-court declaration of the wife of the plaintiff (she 
could not sue on her own behalf) "immediately [sic] upon the Hurt re- 
ceived, and before that she had Time to devise or contrive any Thing for 
25. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1747, at 195. It is interesting to speculate how Wigmore, 
whose intellectual maturity coincided with the arrival of psychoanalytic theory in America, might 
have been influenced by the growth of Freudian psychology. The psychoanalytic insight that 
emotions ometimes affect mental function, intellect, and perception supports Wigmore's theory that 
stress stills reflection. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. Similarly, in 1929 Edmund Morgan described a hearsay exception relating to 
"spontaneous" utterance. See generally Morgan, supra note 19. Such an utterance concerns "a 
startling event" made "by a declarant laboring under such a stress of nervous excitement, caused by 
that event, as to make such utterance spontaneous and unreflective." Id. at 238. This spontaneous 
utterance was admissible in many courts despite its hearsay status. See id. According to Morgan, the 
declaration was likely to be trustworthy because "the mental condition of the declarant is such that 
the probability of his being able to devise a falsehood is very remote." Id. at 239. 
28. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1749, at 199 (discussing "the superior trustworthiness" of the 
out-of-court statements as "creating a necessity or at least a desirability of resorting to them for 
unbiased testimony"). See generally W.A. Harrington, Annotation, Time Element as Affecting 
Admissibility of Statement or Complaint Made by Victim of Sex Crime as Res Gestae, Spontaneous 
Exclamation, or Excited Utterance, 89 A.L.R.3d 102 (1979) (Supp. 1996) (organizing excited 
utterance cases by lapse of time). Furthermore, Wigmore argued that the exception required no 
principle of necessity to be admissible; neither death nor other reasons for absence of the witness 
need be shown to admit the spontaneous exclamation. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1748. 
Wigmore was adamant that bystander declarations should be admissible so long as the bystander was 
under the stress of nervous excitement. See id. ? 1750, at 202-03. Moreover, he believed that 
insanity, criminality, and infancy did not disqualify a declarant. See id. ? 1751; see also McCORMICK, 
supra note 7, ? 272, at 476 ("The declarant need not actually be involved in the event; an excited 
utterance by a bystander is admissible."); Quick, supra note 22, at 213 (discussing the issue of 
competence and excited utterance). Wigmore observed that the primary objection to the testimony of 
children-that they would not understand the solemnity of the oath--did not apply in the excited 
utterance setting where none of the declarations were made under oath anyway. See 6 WIGMORE, 
supra note 11, ? 1751, at 223. 
29. See id. ? 1747, at 196 (citing Skinner 402 (1693)). Here is the opinion in full: 
Ruled upon Evidence, that a Mayhem may be given in Evidence, in an Action of Trespass 
of Assault, Battery, and Wounding, as an Evidence of Wounding per Holt Chief Justice; and 
in this Case he also allowed, that what the Wife said immediate upon the Hurt received, and 
before that she had Time to devise or contrive any Thing for her own Advantage, might be 
given in Evidence; Quod nota; this was at Nisi prius in Middlesex for wounding of the Wife 
of the Plaintiff. 
Thompson v. Trevanion, Skinner 402 (1693). 
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her own Advantage . . . ."o Interestingly, the case that, according to 
Wigmore, established the excited utterance is ambiguous. It is unclear 
from the very brief text whether the declaration was reliable because the 
wife was excited or because her cry was immediate, or perhaps both. 
Wigmore postulated that precise contemporaneousness was not re- 
quired to meet the excited utterance exception and believed that the 
doctrine did not have a fixed time limit between startling event and ex- 
cited utterance. He disdained the timing issue and decried the 
"lamentable waste of time" expended by various state high courts try- 
ing to pin down precise temporal limits for the doctrine's application.3" 
He believed that duration of stress, rather than exact timing, played the 
predominant role justifying this exception to the hearsay rule.32 
For this reason, Wigmore derided a famous, early, and conten- 
tiously debated33 English case, Regina v. Bedingfield,3 for adhering to 
30. Id. (emphasis added). 
31. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1750, at 221. Wigmore contended that all such judgments 
were contextual and to try to establish a general rule on the time limit "is to trifle with principle and to 
cumber the records with unnecessary and unprofitable quibbles." Id. Ironically, the timing question, 
and all the quibbling it entails, represents a controversial part of the doctrine today and serves as the 
basis of many (unsuccessful) appeals of criminal convictions. See infra notes 58-61 and 
accompanying text. 
32. There is a strong argument that in "restating" the common law, Wigmore overstated the 
entrenchment of the excited utterance doctrine within the common law. Wigmore advocated the 
excited utterance as the true descendant of the res gestae concept and rejected the present sense 
impression (which requires almost contemporaneous utterance, but does not require a stressful 
event). See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1750; see also Moorehead, supra note 22, at 230 ("In 
contrast with his support of the excited utterance exception, Wigmore opposed the exception for 
present sense impression . . . ."). In justifying the admission of these startling statements, Wigmore 
emphasized the confusion caused by the startling event, but undervalued the traditional requirement 
of closeness in time. He failed to appreciate that the continuous agitation of mind was not in itself 
traditionally considered a guarantee of trustworthiness, but rather the stress was a proxy for a 
briefness in time. This confusion is reflected in his interpretation f Thompson v. Trevanion, in which 
Wigmore stressed the excitement but ignored the related timing question; that the statement was said 
"immediate upon the Hurt received." See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ?? 1747, 1749. 
Additionally, Wigmore's scholarship is subject to criticism for his mischaracterization f the 
Supreme Court's decision in Travellers' Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397 (1869). The 
Court in Travellers' emphasized the connection in time and place between the utterance and the 
central fact in the case, rather than the exciting quality of the event. See id. at 408; 6 WIGMORE, 
supra note 11, ? 1747. Wigmore was similarly unforthright in his comment on Vicksburg & Meridian 
Railroad v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99 (1886), where he quoted with approval from Justice Field's dissent, 
stressing the excited nature of the out-of-court s atement, but made no mention of the majority opinion (and gave no indication that Field wrote in dissent). See 6 WIGMORE supra note 11, ? 1749. Also in 
his Vicksburg discussion, Wigmore, in advocating the excited utterance exception, redacted the 
Supreme Court opinion to edit out favorable remarks about Greenleaf, another treatise writer with 
whom Wigmore disagreed. See id. 
33. For those who think that backbiting scholarly commentary and media hype of sensational 
trials are a modem phenomenon, Thayer's three-part article on the Bedingfield case will quickly 
disabuse them of their misplaced nostalgia. The Chief Judge of England responded with acrimony 
when his opinion in Bedingfield was criticized in the London Times. The Chief Judge issued 
pamphlets and newspaper editorials mocking Greenleaf and Taylor, two evidence luminaries who 
had publicly criticized the opinion. Taylor responded in kind, arguing that the Chief Justice's attack 
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a rigid rule of contemporaneousness. In Bedingfield, an English Court 
excluded an utterance made only moments after a startling attack.35 The 
prosecutor wished to tell the jury in his opening statement hat the vic- 
tim had said before dying, "O aunt, see what Bedingfield has done to 
me."36 According to the court, her cry did not qualify as res gestae be- 
cause "it was something stated by her after it was all over .. .."37 Lord 
Cockburn drew the distinction between a statement "uttered by the de- 
ceased at the time the act was being done" and a statement uttered 
"after the act was completed."38 Lord Cockburn explained that had the 
victim cried, "Don't, Harry!" while the violence transpired, her state- 
ment would have been admissible.39 Wigmore criticized the Bedingfield 
court's strict adherence to timing, arguing that it led to troubling, even 
absurd, results.40 Instead, Wigmore emphasized the startling nature of 
was "neither consistent with your dignity, your generosity, nor your justice .... " James B. Thayer, 
Bedingfleld's Case: Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta (Pt. I), 14 AM. L. REv. 817, 823-24 
(1880) [hereinafter Thayer, Bedingfield I]. Thayer himself was not above an acerbic remark, noting 
of the phrase res gestae, "We find it first in the mouths of Garrow and Lord Kenyon,-two famously 
ignorant men." James B. Thayer, Bedingfield's Case, Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta (Pt. II), 
15 AM. L. REv. 1, 10n.1 (1881). 
34. 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341 (1879). 
35. Henry Bedingfield was charged with killing his lover who, according to the court, had 
"refus[ed] him something he very much desired" and appeared to "wish to put an end to these 
relations." See id. at 341. Bedingfield had made prior threats to slit the victim's throat and she had 
asked for police protection. See id. at 341-42. After visiting a "spirit shop," Bedingfield went to her 
house (which was also her place of business). Id. at 342. After a "minute or two the [woman] came 
suddenly out of the house towards [her assistants] with her throat cut, and on meeting one of them she 
said something, pointing backwards to the house. In a few minutes she was dead." Id. The 
defendant was found with his throat cut as well, but he recovered and was charged with murder. He 
pled not guilty, arguing that the woman attacked him and then took her own life. See id. at 344. 
Evidence of the knife in the defendant's bloody grasp, the deep cut in her throat inconsistent with 
suicide, and the fact (not content) of the victim's complaint, however, led to the guilty verdict. See id. 
at 344-45. It is also remarkable how closely the facts of the Bedingfield case fit the tragically 
familiar pattern of a battered woman killed by her lover: an abusive mate, alcohol, failure to receive 
police protection, and death at the hands of the abuser when the woman tries to leave. 
36. See Thayer, Bedingfield I, supra note 33, at 826. 
37. Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. at 342-43. Although Bedingfield was found guilty and 
sentenced to death by hanging, a serious outcry in the press and among scholars arose out of Lord 
Cockburn's exclusion of the woman's remark as falling outside the res gestae exception. See 
Thayer, Bedingfield I, supra note 33, at 819-20. Lord Chief Justice Cockburn also held that the 
deceased's statement did not qualify as a dying declaration, because there was no evidence that the 
victim knew she was dying. See Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. at 343-44. Cf FED. R. EvID. 
804(b)(2) (providing exception to the hearsay rule for statements "made by a declarant while 
believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the 
declarant believed to be impending death"). 
38. Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. at 342-43. 
39. Id. at 342. 
40. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1756 (criticizing Bedingfield as "plainly erroneous"). 
Interestingly, early cases often fit this pattern of a victim who named his attacker minutes after the 
grisly attack, just before dying of his wounds. See, e.g., Rex v. Foster, 6 Car. & P. 325 (1834); Little 
Rock, M.R. & T. Ry. Co. v. Leverett, 3 S.W. 50 (Ark. 1887). 
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the event and claimed that the excitement itself insured credibility.4' 
Wigmore's insistence on the abandonment of any contemporaneousness 
requirement fashioned the current doctrine. 
B. The Current Doctrine 
Under the modem excited utterance exception as codified in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence42 (and adopted by over thirty states),43 the 
hearsay rule does not exclude a statement by an out-of-court declarant 
"relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."" In 
describing the utility of this exception, modem commentators echo the 
historical rationale. As Weinstein and Berger explain, "The assumption 
underlying this exception is that a person under the sway of excitement 
precipitated by an external startling event will not have the reflective 
capacity essential for fabrication and that, consequently, any utterance 
will be spontaneous and trustworthy."45 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the excited utterance excep- 
tion applies regardless of the declarant's availability to testify at trial.46 
Therefore, the declarant need not testify, even if he or she is available.47 
41. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1747, at 195. 
42. Unlike other federal procedural rules (civil procedure, appellate procedure, criminal 
procedure, and bankruptcy) the federal rules of evidence are statutorily passed by Congress and not 
promulgated via the Rules Enabling Act. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal 
Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 893-94 (1992). 
43. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE 
STATES iii (Supp. 1994). 
44. FED. R. EvID. 803(2). The Federal Rules of Evidence provide separate exceptions for 
spontaneous utterances distinguishing between contemporaneity and stress. Rule 803(1) preserves 
the present-sense impression exception for statements immediately contemporaneous with an event. 
See FED. R. EvDo. 803(1). Rule 803(2) retains the excited utterance; it requires no precise 
coalescence of exclamation and event, but does require the declarant to experience and speak under 
the influence of the stress of the startling event. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
45. WEINSTEIN & BURGER, supra note 22, ? 803(2)[01]. 
46. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 sets forth exceptions to the hearsay rule, including the 
excited utterance exception, for which availability of the declarant is immaterial. See FED. R. EvID. 
803. Rule 803 includes those hearsay statements that have been considered either so trustworthy as to 
be admissible without requiring imposition of the time and expense associated with production of a 
declarant if available, or of a type where cross-examination of the declarant would provide no 
additional information to the fact finder. 
47. An excited utterance is "not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness." FED. R. EVID. 803. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) sets forth exceptions to 
the hearsay rule for which the declarant's inability as a witness is required. FED. R. EvID. 804(b) 
(excluding from the hearsay ban statements made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify, 
including former testimony, statement under belief of impending death, statement against interest, 
etc.). For the purposes of these hearsay exceptions, unavailability of a witness is defined in Rule 
804(a). "Unavailability of a witness" includes situations in which the declarant is exempted from 
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The excitement of the event, which justifies its reliability, also "serves to 
justify dispensing with any requirement that the declarant be unavailable 
because it suggests that testimony on the stand, given at a time when the 
powers of reflection and fabrication are operative, is no more (and per- 
haps less) reliable than the out-of-court statement.""48 In fact, the iden- 
tity of the excited utterer need not be known, although courts and 
commentators advocate caution in cases involving unidentified bystand- 
ers .49 
According to many treatise writers, the contemporary excited utter- 
ance exception is "well established,""5 "time-honored,"5' and "abun- 
dantly supported by pre-Rules federal cases."52 The Supreme Court's 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence provides further indication of the en- 
trenchment of the excited utterance exception. The Supreme Court has 
twice reaffirmed its faith in the excited utterance exception as histori- 
cally tested and doctrinally sound." 
testifying by ruling of the court, refuses to testify to the statement despite a court order, testifies to a 
lack of memory regarding the statement, or is unable to appear in court. See FED. R. EvID. 804(a). 
48. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 272. 
49. See, e.g., Shinner v. K-Mart Corp., 847 F. Supp. 31 (D. Del. 1994) (involving unidentified 
person who came to assist plaintiff who slipped on wet floor); Watson v. State, No. 94-1040, 1995 
Ark. App. LEXIS (Ark. Ct. App. 1995) ("While statements made by an unidentified bystander- 
declarant may be subjected to special scrutiny, they may still fall within the excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule."); Coleman v. Spah, C5-92-713, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 1114 (1992) 
(quoting the advisory committee note "When declarant is an unidentified bystander, the cases 
indicate hesitancy in upholding the statement alone as sufficient [to establish the statement was made 
under aura of excitement]"); WEINSTEIN & BURGER, supra note 22; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ? 6753, at 574-75 (1978). 
50. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 272, at 476 (conceding that "the entire basis" of the excited 
utterance is "subject to question" but labeling it "well established"). 
51. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 24, ? 803.7, at 440 (describing the exception as "time- 
honored"). 
52. WEINSTEIN & BURGER, supra note 22 (footnote omitted). 
53. In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Court held that an excited utterance made to a 
doctor by a four-year-old girl was sufficiently reliable to overcome confrontation concerns because 
such an utterance was a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, cited only Wigmore's treatise and the old case of Thompson v. Trevanion, Skinner 402 
(1693), as proof that the exception was firmly rooted. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
The Court concluded that hearsay that falls under the excited utterance "is so trustworthy that 
adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability." White, 502 U.S. at 357. 
In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Court rejected the admission of a two and a half- 
year-old child's statement concerning her sexual molestation. The statement had been admitted 
under the residual or catch-all hearsay exception, which the Court decided was not firmly rooted but 
rather a newfangled creation of the Federal Rules, meant to be applied sparingly and only ad hoc. 
See id. at 817-18. In analyzing the absence of "indicia of reliability," the Court compared the 
statement admitted under the residual exception to statements admitted under more fixed and 
respected hearsay exceptions. In dicta, the Court explained that under some exceptions, "the 
declarant's truthfulness is so clear from surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination 
would be of marginal utility." Id. at 820. It cited the excited utterance as an example of such 
trustworthy hearsay. The Court explained that the "basis for the 'excited utterance' exception.., .is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, 
coaching, or confabulation." Id. 
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Nonetheless, the excited utterance exception is not as clearly estab- 
lished as the Supreme Court and commentators suggest. For example, 
in White v. Illinois, the Court recently held that an excited utterance of a 
four-year-old girl overcame Confrontation Clause concerns because the 
utterance fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.54 The Court 
concluded that hearsay that qualifies as an excited utterance "is so trust- 
worthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reli- 
ability."55 Yet, as proof of the "firmly rooted" nature of the excited 
utterance, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, simply cited 
its adoption as part of the Federal Rules and by most states. The Chief 
Justice listed only two sources of precedent: Wigmore's treatise and the 
1693 case of Thompson v. Trevanion.56 
The contemporary excited utterance exception also presents several 
recurrent doctrinal problems, including when to characterize an event as 
sufficiently exciting or stressful, and how to prove that the event actually 
occurred (in other words, whether the statement itself can prove the ex- 
citing event, or whether the proponent must adduce evidence independ- 
ent of the statement)." Most notably, courts continue to struggle with 
the timing question, trying to establish the maximum time that may 
elapse between the event and the statement for the declaration to fall 
within the exception.58 According to the Advisory Committee note, 
"the standard of measurement is the duration of the state of excite- 
ment."59 This is clearly a fact-bound inquiry; in fact, courts look for 
indications of continuing excitement based on many diverse factors, 
such as the nature of the startling event and the age and temperament of 
54. 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992). The Court in White purportedly adhered to the standard it 
articulated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), which it interpreted as holding that use of "firmly 
rooted" hearsay exceptions do not violate an accused's right to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment. See also Wright, 497 U.S. at 805. 
55. White, 502 U.S. at 357 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-21). Criticism of the Court's Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence is widespread. Professor Eleanor Swift has aptly described the Court's 
opinion in White as "overbroad, unjustified and embarrassing." Eleanor Swift, Smoke and Mirrors: 
The Failure of the Supreme Court's Accuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois Requires a New Look at 
Confrontation, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 145, 152 (1993). For the purposes of this inquiry, however, it is 
interesting to observe the Court's confidence in the excited utterance exception. 
56. See White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8. This is particularly troubling given the prospect that 
Thompson v. Trevanion, Skinner 402 (1693), is subject to alternate interpretations, and that Wigmore 
shaped the doctrine much more than merely restating it. See supra note 32. 
57. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(2) advisory committee's note (commenting on question of 
proving the startling event); WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 22, ? 803(2)[01]. 
58. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 272 (casting the temporal element as probably the most 
important of the many factors entering into the determination); see also Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 
1050, 1057-58 (6th Cir. 1983) (weighing whether a child's statement made an hour and a half after 
the event should be excluded). 
59. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee's note. The advisory committee questions, "How 
long can excitement prevail? Obviously there are no pat answers and the character of the 
transaction or event will largely determine the significance of the time factor." Id. (citing M.C. 
Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IOWA L. REV. 224, 243 (1961)). 
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the declarant."6 However, such a fact-bound inquiry produces widely 
varying and unpredictable results. In some cases, a lapse of an hour is 
too long, while in other, albeit rare, cases, twenty hours of continuous 
agitation meets the excited utterance standard.6' 
Moreover, despite codification of the evidence rule, trial judges still 
possess enormous discretion in deciding whether to admit these 
statements. Where sympathy exists for the victim, particularly in child 
abuse cases, courts often stretch the excited utterance doctrine beyond 
recognition-both in imputing stress62 and in extending the time that the 
declarant is under the influence of that stress well beyond traditional 
limits.63 
The willingness of some courts to stretch the doctrinal require- 
ments, though understandable and sometimes even admirable, causes 
60. See, e.g., People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 860 (Ct. App. 1994) (describing victim, who 
made an excited utterance within four hours of the attack, as "either crying, wringing her hands, 
covering her face, averting her eyes from whomever was talking to her or talking about how scared, 
upset and nervous she was"); People v. Brown, 517 N.E.2d 515, 519 (N.Y. 1987) (citing specific 
factors such as the victim's "hemorrhagic shock" and resuscitation in addition to lack of time to 
reflect in the thirty minutes between the shooting and the victim's emergency room statement as 
indications of spontaneity). 
61. Compare Pacifico v. State, 642 So. 2d 1178, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (excluding 
statement made only approximately one hour after a violent rape as an excited utterance because 
"the time lapse between the sexual encounter and the victim's statements to her roommates was 
sufficient o permit reflective thought") and Handel v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 297 N.Y.S. 
216 (App. Div. 1937), affd mem., 13 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 1938) (excluding statement made two and 
one-half minutes after declarant had been dragged by a train) with State v. Stipek, 995 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 1355, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the "precise amount of time that may lapse 
before a statement loses its spontaneity as an excited utterance cannot be established by any absolute 
rule of law" and finding no abuse of discretion where statements to survivor's boyfriend made four to 
six weeks after the alleged offense were allowed as excited utterances) and People v. Houghteling, 
455 N.W.2d 440 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (admitting statement of five-year-old made 20 hours after 
assault). 
62. See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the 
Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 706 n.68 (1993). Courts 
also tend to credit children's statements about sexual assault because they do not believe children 
have sufficient knowledge or sophistication to fabricate sexual encounters. See, e.g., State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 159 (S.D. 1985) (holding that statements made by four-year-old boy to his mother in 
normal course of daily activities two to three days after the traumatic event, "coupled with the 
inability we perceive of the child to fabricate an account of such a heinous sexual encounter, warrant 
a finding that the statements were excited utterances"). 
63. See Mosteller, supra note 62 (explaining expansion of allowable time period between the 
exciting event and hearsay statement "under a theory that the psychological characteristics of 
children either cause excitement o inhibit reflective thought for a longer period of time or greatly 
minimize that danger [of fabrication]"); see also McCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 272.1, at 478 ("many 
courts have liberally interpreted the allowable period of time between the exciting event and the 
child's description of it"). See, e.g., Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the time factor may be lengthened in cases of molestation by adult male family members because it is 
particularly traumatic); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947-48 (4th Cir. 1988) ("tender years" 
reduce likelihood of "reflection and fabrication"); State v. Smith, 337 S.E.2d 833, 842-43 (N.C. 1985) (holding that time lapse of two to three days still resulted in admissible utterance). See generally 
Harrington, supra note 28 (dividing excited utterances by time and distinguishing minors from adults). 
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confusion and inconsistency." Although such resort to legal fiction 
may seem compassionate in individual cases, the legal standard has be- 
come undesirably muddled. As a result, the excited utterance exception 
sometimes operates as the unofficial garbage pail of hearsay excep- 
tions.65 It occasionally functions as a de facto residual exception with- 
out the doctrinal limitations of the narrowly-drawn residual hearsay 
exception currently codified under the rules.66 
Furthermore, the problem is not as simple as judges ignoring the 
formal requirements of a silly rule to achieve a fair result. Judicial 
stretching of the excited utterance exception is by nature selective and 
motivated by a distinct point of view. While some judges seem reluctant 
to allow legal formalism to triumph, others adhere to the doctrine rig- 
idly.67 Such literal and unbending applications of the excited utterance 
doctrine, particularly with respect to issues of timing, arise even in sym- 
pathetic cases. Therefore, the excited utterance exception is applied in a 
chaotic and idiosyncratic manner; this inconsistency bespeaks unfair- 
ness and unequal treatment of similar out-of-court statements. 
These inconsistent responses by judges reveals basic flaws in the 
doctrine and, perhaps, in the hearsay rule itself. Moreover, as the next 
Section shows, there is reason to doubt that the excited utterance excep- 
tion's reliance on timing and stress guarantees trustworthiness. 
64. Cf. Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L 
REV. 1447 (1994) (explaining the importance of uniformity and predictability in procedural rules). 
65. See State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 924 (Idaho 1986) ("In sex crime cases, the excited 
utterance exception often receives broader application than in other cases."); John E. B. Myers, The 
Child Sexual Abuse Literature: A Call for Greater Objectivity, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1729-30 
(1990) (book review) (noting the "particularly troublesome" expansive use of the excited utterance 
in child abuse cases). 
66. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) provides residual, or catch-all, exceptions to the hearsay 
rule. Rule 803(24) excepts from the hearsay rule "a statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness .... " FED. 
R. EvID. 803(24). The court may admit the statement upon a finding that the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact, that it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and that the general purposes 
of the Rules and interests of justice will be best served by the admission of the statement. See id. The 
proponent of the statement must give notice to the adverse party in advance. See id. Rulings made 
under the residual exception have no precedential effect. See WEINSTEIN & BURGER, supra note 22, ? 803(24)[01] (noting that catchall decisions have only limited precedential effect); Thomas M. 
Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IowA L. REV. 413, 452 
(1989) ("Because a proper determination under the catchall exception is largely dependent on the 
peculiarities of the particular trial, trial court rulings under the catchall exception and appellate 
affirmances or reversals legitimately carry no precedential value."). 
67. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 449 (Utah 1989) ("While it is true that the victim 
was still under the stress and shock of the assault, we believe that we would be pushing the limits of 
the rule to hold admissible the entire contents of this one-hour interview as an 'excited utterance."'); 
People v. Brown, 524 N.E.2d 742, 747-78 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that 50 minutes from event to 
statement, and victim's reflection on whether she should call the police 10-15 minutes before her 
statement was made, constituted "pause to reflect [that] negated the spontaneity of her statement"). 
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C. The Psychological Critique of the 
Excited Utterance Doctrine 
The excited utterance exception has been subjected to extensive 
psychological criticism. While this Article does not comprehensively 
examine this critique of the doctrine, it does outline it. Perhaps what is 
most remarkable is not the critique itself but the continued resilience of 
the excited utterance doctrine in the face of this persuasive psychologi- 
cal critique. This persistence despite decades of criticism demonstrates 
the entrenchment of the doctrine and prompts inquiry regarding the 
special hold that the excited utterance doctrine has on our jurisprudence 
and culture. 
Today, Wigmore's description of the effect of stress seems primi- 
tive and one-sided. His analysis of the effect of stress-that it stills con- 
scious thought-undervalues other factors in the complicated process of 
perception. From a functional as well as a philosophical point of view, 
Wigmore's theory underestimates the vast cognitive processes that tran- 
spire as part of any utterance. Even as a declarant spontaneously yells, 
"MY GOD, the car ran the red light!" he is thinking, making choices, 
processing images, translating those images, and choosing words. It is, 
therefore, hard to divine what part of that complicated process is delib- 
erate and what part is "instinctive" or "impulsive."68 
Furthermore, despite its intuitive appeal, Wigmore's notion that a 
person would not have time to think up a lie before making an excited 
utterance in response to a startling event is not borne out by psycho- 
logical research. The time required to craft a lie is slight-sometimes 
only a matter of seconds.69 The excited utterance exception, which tol- 
erates more than a thirty-minute gap between the event and the utter- 
ance, allows more than sufficient time for planning a false report. 
68. See Stanley A. Goldman, Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Exclamations as a "Firmly Rooted" 
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 23 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 453, 459 (1990) (questioning the "assumption 
that descriptive accuracy is a natural consequence of immediate observation"); Stewart, supra note 
16 at 29 ("[E]ven without considering falsification and the distorting effect of excitement, 
contemporaneous utterances are subject to distortion in the declarant's perception and memory (the 
declaration need only be substantially contemporaneous) as well as the perception and memory of the 
reporting witness."). 
69. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 
28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 437 (1928) (asserting that the difference in reaction time between deceptive 
and sincere responses is negligible). Psychological studies support this observation and indicate that 
the difference between the time of cognition and the time when the declarant may begin to fabricate 
is so small that it is often impossible to measure without instruments. See Goldman, supra note 68, at 
460 (arguing that "the hearsay statement would have to be spoken virtually simultaneously with the 
described event for even the slightest assurance of increased reliability"); Quick, supra note 22, at 
210 (noting psychological studies questioning the argument that spontaneity is a reasonable guarantee 
of sincerity); Stewart supra note 16, at 28 n.126 (citing HAROLD ERNEST BURTT, LEGAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (1931)). 
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Finally, and most importantly, the excited utterance doctrine's em- 
phasis on sincerity obfuscates the much more pressing issues of percep- 
tion and memory.7 It reflects the disproportionate concern that 
evidence law evinces for deliberate falsification, as compared with hon- 
est error produced by the normal operation of cognitive processes." 
Psychological reordering and confabulation permeate all human obser- 
vation; they do not necessarily arise out of a desire to lie, but merely 
reflect the complex process of human perception. The psychological 
literature indicates that perceiving and remembering are more decisively 
matters of construction than mechanical recording and reproduction.72 
If twentieth-century intellectual thought has taught us anything, it is how 
intricate human thought and awareness are, and yet how generally 
oblivious we are to their processes. 
70. As my colleagues Professors Jeffrey Rachlinsky and Alex Tanford have explained to me, a 
person experiences a series of cognitive stages in translating a live event into a witness' testimony: 
sensation (the activation of neural receptors in response to stimuli); perception (the automatic process 
of assembling sensations into a mental representation of the world); encoding (moving the perception 
into memory); storage (keeping the memory intact); and retrieval (retrieving the event from long- 
term memory). See CHARLES G. MORRIS, PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 232-238 (9th ed. 1996) 
(discussing sensation, perception, encoding, and retrieval). Breakdown at any one of these stages 
will result in an inaccurate or incomplete memory. For instance, if observers do not have enough 
time to process and encode the event, they may engage in perceptual confabulation, whereby their 
overloaded brains unconsciously attempt to fill in the gaps in information. See CLIFFORD & BULL, 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OFPERSON IDENTIFICATION 17-18 (1978). 
There are at least three types of memory: (1) sensory memory, lasting less than one second (just 
long enough to store sensory information), see THE ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 
207 (Terry F. Pettijohn editorial adviser, 4th ed. 1991); (2) short-term memory, defined as "the 
working memory that contains information currently in use being acted upon and in consciousness"; 
and (3) long-term memory, which corresponds to "everything we 'know."' MORRIS, supra at 234. 
Excited utterance concerns long-term memory--even if the utterance was made only five minutes 
after the startling event. Memory of five minutes ago is linked to long-term memory rather than 
short-term memory because short-term memory is not measured merely by time elapsed between an 
event and recalling that event. Rather, it is measured in terms of the capacity to hold a certain 
amount of information in the working consciousness. Once information has left consciousness, or 
short-term memory, it is stored as long-term memory, or lost in 15 to 20 seconds. See CHARLES G. 
MORRIS, PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 226-29, 234 (7th ed. 1990); YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 57-62 (1979) (charting various types of memory and listing short-term 
as that which can be retained for 15-20 seconds). 
71. This highlights a fundamental question underlying the hearsay doctrine: Why is sincerity 
the emphasis of so many exceptions to the hearsay rule? Of the four hearsay dangers (perception, 
memory, narration, and sincerity) why does solving the problem of sincerity seem to assuage the 
other three concerns about reliability? Honest people can be wrong. There is a wealth of literature 
on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. See D.S. Greer, Anything But the Truth? The Reliability 
of Testimony in Criminal Trials, 11 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 131, 133-35 (1971), quoted in Steven I. 
Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
165, 167 n.14 (1990) (discussing inaccuracy of juries in evaluating eyewitness testimony). One 
explanation for the emphasis on sincerity stems from Professor Imwinkelried's hypothesis of the 
"worst evidence principle." Our fear of lying witnesses surpasses, and perhaps overwhelms, any 
other reliability concerns. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10. 
72. See Stewart, supra note 16, at 10 (quoting F. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING 204, 205 
(paperback ed. 1967)). 
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For decades, scholars have attacked the wisdom of fashioning an 
exception to the hearsay rule that depends upon the excited and stress- 
ful state of the speaker.7 Although the psychological evidence is 
mixed, the standard psychological critique questions the reliability of 
excited utterances.74 Whereas the excited utterance exception is prem- 
ised on the notion that stress leads to sincerity, many scholars instead 
propose that extreme stress leads to confusion.7 Even assuming that the 
declarant's sincerity is enhanced by his or her agitated state, the reli- 
ability of the excited utterance may in fact be counterbalanced, or even 
outweighed, by the declarant's diminished perception and memory.'7 
Declarants' startled utterances may be honest declarations of what they 
73. In fact, the first criticisms of the excited utterance exception are almost as old as 
Wigmore's formulation of the doctrine itself. In a famous 1928 article, entitled Some Observations 
on the Law of Evidence, Professors Hutchins and Slesinger raised practical and psychological 
concerns about courts' treatment of spontaneous declarations. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 
69. They noted that courts tended to favor excited utterances over present sense impressions, and 
that courts felt most comfortable admitting evidence where the declarant was under the stress of an 
exciting event. See id. at 433. They argued that the reverse should be true, and that present sense 
impressions, uttered precisely while the event transpired, were more reliable. See id. at 440. The 
excited utterance exception, because it allows a brief time lag between the event and the exclamation 
and depends on excitement to ensure sincerity, was, in the estimation of Hutchins and Slesinger, less 
reliable, although still admissible. See id.; see also David P. Leonard, Perspective on Proposed 
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 315 (1995) (discussing the questionable psychology of the excited 
utterance); Moorehead, supra note 22, at 203 (criticizing the excited utterance and asking "[w]ould 
you entrust your life to the judgment or perception of a person who is acting under extreme stress or 
trauma?"). 
74. See JAMES MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 16 (1966) (criticizing the 
excited utterance because it ignores "the distorting impact of trauma on the capacity to perceive"); 
MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 272, at 476 ("The entire basis for the exception is, of course, subject to 
question. While psychologists would probably concede that excitement minimizes the possibility of 
reflective self-interest influencing the declarant's statements, they have questioned whether this 
might be outweighed by the distorting effect of shock and excitement upon the declarant's 
observation and judgement."); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, The Influence of Arousal on Reliability of 
Testimony, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 235, 236 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. 
Clifford eds., 1983) (criticizing the apparent view of American courts that heightened arousal 
increases accuracy of memory). 
75. Stress is defined as "environmental challenges severe enough to threaten psychological or 
physiological well-being." PETER D. SPEAR ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIOR 545 
(1988). The terms stress, excitement, and arousal are used interchangeably. See Deffenbacher, 
supra note 74 (using "stress," "arousal," and "excitement" interchangeably). Stress can infect the 
complicated process of imprinting, absorbing, and receiving information. See id. at 247-48 (noting 
lack of empirical support for idea that high levels of arousal facilitate eyewitness testimony, and 
noting that violence may further impair witness testimony). The "startling event" of the excited 
utterance rule, which typically includes accidents and violent crimes, clearly falls within the 
psychological definition of stress, even if the declarant is only a bystander as opposed to a participant 
or a victim. 
76. Or as Hutchins and Slesinger concluded, "What the emotion gains by way of overcoming 
the desire to lie, it loses by impairing the declarant's power of observation." Hutchins & Schlesinger, 
supra note 69, at 439. 
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thought they saw, but the very stress that makes them so honest can also 
interfere with their ability to perceive, transcribe, and remember events.7 
One prominent psychological theory of stress and memory posits 
that the level of fear or stress experienced in acquiring information in- 
fluences the quality of information stored in long-term memory.78 Be- 
sides the distracting excitement itself, there may be strong personal 
feelings evoked by the startling event that affect memory and percep- 
tion.79 These factors conspire to undermine the accuracy of the excited 
statement and, in turn, raise serious questions about the theory of the 
excited utterance exception. 
77. In 1937, Professor Morgan similarly criticized the trend toward requiring a startling 
occurrence for res gestae. The requirement "seems a decided mistake, for it insists upon an element 
which has a positive tendency to produce inaccurate observation-and inaccuracy of observation is 
one of the greatest obstacles to the discovery of facts in litigation." Edmund M. Morgan, Res Gestae, 
12 WASH. L. REV. 91, 98 (1937). 
78. See ELIZABETH F. LoFTus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL 47-51 (1987). The complex role of stress in perception and the efficiency of memory has 
been encapsulated in the Yerkes-Dodson law. See id. at 48. The Yerkes-Dodson law posits the 
existence of an optimal stress level in which the observer performs at his perceptual peak. Too little 
stress, and the observer's nervous system may not function fully. See id. Without any arousal or 
anxiety the observer may pay insufficient attention. Too much stress, however, impairs perception 
and memory, creating a "disorganizing effect." The Yerkes-Dodson curve plots the level of arousal 
against the efficiency of memory as measured by task performance. See Deffenbacher, supra note 
75, at 237. For tasks of any real complexity, the relationship between arousal and performance is 
curvilinear. The optimal stress level varies with the nature of the activity. The more excited a person 
is, the less complexity he can handle. See id. Excited utterances concern higher than optimal stress 
levels. See id. at 247 ("[A]rousal levels engendered by crimes of violence, homicides, rapes, 
assaults, armed robberies, are almost invariably going to be greater than the Yerkes-Dodson 
optimum, given the reasonable high complexity of the task expected of eyewitnesses."). Clifford and 
Bull observed that "[u]nder conditions of stress, anxiety and fear the level of cognitive complexity 
used to perceive with may be very sub-optimal." CLIFFORD & BULL, supra note 70, at 51. Perhaps 
the closest simulation of the condition of excited utterance stems from staged exciting events or 
violent films, after which the observer's perception and memory are tested. Clifford and Hollin 
conducted an experiment where subjects viewed films with varying levels of violence. The subjects' 
arousal was measured by galvanic skin responses. Photographic identification was less accurate for 
subjects viewing the more violent film, and such subjects' lower recall of the perpetrators' personal 
characteristics was statistically significant. See Deffenbacher, supra note 75, at 244 (citing B.R. 
Clifford & C.R. Hollin, Effects of the Type of Incident and Number of Perpetrators on Eyewitness 
Memory, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 364-70 (1981)). Loftus and Burns showed witnesses either a 
violent or a non-violent version of a bank robbery. The observers shown the violent film where a 
young boy is shot in the face recalled and recognized less detail from the film. See id. at 245 (citing 
E.F. Loftus & T.E. Burns, Mental Shock Can Produce Retrograde Amnesia (1981) (paper presented 
at meetings of the Psychonomic Society, Philadelphia)). In addition, the experimenters showed that 
the memory impairment derived from the shock of the violent episode rather than merely the surprise 
of the hold-up. See id. Finally, in a simulated robbery which transpired in a classroom of over one 
hundred unsuspecting college students, researchers found that students who reported less stress 
during the incident were significantly more accurate in identifying the thief. CLIFFORD & BULL, 
supra note 70, at 53-54. 
79. Loftus and Doyle cite evidence that people who experience natural disasters, such as 
floods or earthquakes, often remember very little, particularly when the memories are painful. See 
id. at 32. Another study indicates that the more violent and emotion-provoking the crime, the less well 
it will be remembered. See id. at 51. 
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Additionally, some psychological data indicate that, as a self- 
protective device, witnesses may initially suppress unpleasant memories, 
which only emerge in later, calmer times." Such data argue directly 
against application of the excited utterance exception, because the wit- 
ness' ability to recall will not be at its best so near in time to the trau- 
matic event. 
The picture that emerges from the recent psychological literature 
on the effect of stress on memory, however, is neither simple nor par- 
ticularly coherent. Some of the early works on stress and accuracy may 
be criticized because they fail to consider the connection between the 
stressful event and the particular facts to be remembered. Similarly, 
they do not account for the type of information to be remembered.81 
Moreover, some modem psychologists dispute the notion that stress al- 
ways diminishes accurate observation, and argue instead that arousal 
may improve accurate memory of certain central information.82 These 
psychologists assert that an excited event can occupy all of a person's 
working short-term memory. As a result, the person becomes focused 
on the event and cannot think about anything else. This circumstance 
thus impedes the person's ability to fabricate.83 
Fortunately, this Article need not stake out a position on this debate 
within psychology because the excited utterance exception, as currently 
applied, makes no sense under either theory. Even assuming that stress 
has a positive, focusing effect, that effect is short lived, because it applies 
to short-term memory. The excited utterance exception, however, rou- 
tinely admits statements made thirty minutes after the exciting event. 
This gap in time is too long to obtain the benefit from this postulated 
window of sincerity. 
For the purposes of this Article, the more important conclusion is 
that the excited utterance doctrine remains vibrant despite serious psy- 
chological criticisms of its efficacy and wisdom. Whatever the merits of 
the traditional psychological critique, it is fascinating and telling that a 
powerful and longstanding critique of the excited utterance doctrine 
exists, and yet the doctrine has remained widely accepted and applied, 
80. See Sven-Ake Christianson, Emotional Stress and Eyewitness Memory: A Critical Review, 
112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 284, 290-94 (1992) (noting the central features of unpleasant events may be 
better remembered than neutral events, but such enhanced memory will occur after a lapse of time). 
81. Additionally, some of these early experiments did not adequately account for the many 
variables that may affect the experimental outcomes, including the nature of the stressful event, the 
level and duration of stress actually experienced, and the variations in individual stress tolerance. In 
fact, a persistent problem with the psychological research stems from the ethical limitations on 
scientists in inducing stress levels equivalent to those caused by violent crimes or car accidents. 
82. See Howard Egeth, Emotion and the Eyewitness, in THE HEART'S EYE: EMOTIONAL 
INFLUENCES IN PERCEPTION A D ATTENTION 257-58 (P.M. Neidenthal & S. Kitayama eds., 1994). 
83. See id. 
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and even venerated." A feminist analysis, examining how the excited 
utterance exception represents and perhaps even influences cultural val- 
ues, may explain the tenacity of the doctrine in the face of such schol- 
arly criticism.85 
III 
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 
A. Difference, Dominance, and Evidentiary Objectivity 
Modem feminism, which grew out of a conscious attempt to respect 
women's voices and experiences, has developed analytical tools to ex- 
amine how those voices are heard and how those experiences are proc- 
essed.86 Professor Deborah Rhode has explained that a feminist method 
"implies a commitment to gender as a focus of concern and to analytic 
approaches that reflect women's concrete experience.""87 Feminist 
method examines the status quo to "identify the gender implications of 
rules and practices which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objec- 
tive."8s It screens for rules and cultural norms that conflict with the ex- 
perience of women, drawing insight from women's psychological 
experience of being "other"89 and from women's practical experience 
84. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's recent 
support for the doctrine). 
85. Of course, another explanation for the excited utterance doctrine's longevity may be that 
jurists generally disregard the advice of evidence scholars and psychologists. Here, for obvious 
reasons, I eschew Occam's razor, which prefers the simplest of all competing theories. See A. 
Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy-Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 267, 285 n.128 (1996). 
86. Some argue that modern feminism arose from consciousness-raising groups and attempts to 
speak out against gender inequalities. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and 
Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 9 (1988) (describing consciousness-raising as the process of validating 
women's experience and learning from these experiences). Although feminists disagree about how 
to interpret women's experiences and what to do about them, all feminists are dedicated to the 
fundamental goal of eliminating the oppression of women. See Lynne Henderson, Law's Patriarchy, 
25 L. & Soc'Y REV. 411, 417 (1991) (noting the shared goal of all branches of feminism to eradicate 
women's subordinate status). 
87. Deborah L. Rhode, The "No Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 
100 YALE LJ. 1731, 1736 (1991); see Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the 
Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 195 (1989-90) ("[T]here does appear to be general 
agreement that feminist method begins with the primacy of women's experience."). 
88. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: 
READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 370, 371 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) 
(describing this as "the woman question"). Bartlett presents a method for feminist analysis that is 
designed to "reveal features of a legal issue which more traditional methods tend to overlook or 
suppress." Id. at 371-74. 
89. See id. at 385 (discussing "feminist standpoint epistemology," which "identifies woman's 
status as that of victim, and then privileges that status by claiming that it gives access to understanding 
about oppression that others cannot have"). 
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of unequal treatment.90 In doing so, feminist method sheds light on 
cultural biases, exposes power differences between the sexes, and chal- 
lenges the cultural, social, and legal status quo. 
In applying a feminist method to evidence law, this Article draws 
on two important schools of feminism: "difference feminism," also 
known as relational or cultural feminism, and "dominance," or radical, 
feminism. I have chosen these two schools of thought because they are 
the most prominent and current, and because they are rich in theory. 
Drawing on political, philosophical, and socio-linguistic contributions to 
understanding ender in our society, difference and dominance femi- 
nism offer excellent tools for analyzing evidence law. 
Difference feminism posits that women, as a result of their social- 
ized roles, or perhaps (more controversially) their natural propensities,91 
perceive and think about the world differently from the way that men 
do. Strongly influenced by the "ethic of care" articulated by Nel 
Noddings and Carol Gilligan,92 difference feminists argue that women 
have unique ways of knowing and relating that differ from men's ap- 
proaches. Without claiming that this different voice is descriptive of all 
women,93 or necessarily better than the approach used by men (although 
this is sometimes implied), these feminists have attempted to identify the 
nature of a "different voice." Difference feminists contend that 
whereas men's interactions are often governed by hierarchy and status, 
90. See generally Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A 
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987) (arguing that 
women experience pain differently from men, and that feminist method should describe women's 
subjective lives, especially their differing painful experiences). For some concrete observations 
about how law and legal language prefer a male perspective, see Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking 
Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 886, 898 & nn. 56-61 (1989). 
91. Even among difference feminists, there are serious differences. Some difference feminists 
seem to argue that women's differences from men derive from the essential nature of women 
themselves, emanating, if not from biology, then from biologically driven roles stemming from 
women's potential for childbirth and nursing. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) ("Underlying both radical and cultural feminism is a conception of 
women's existential state that is grounded in women's potential for physical, material connection to 
human life.") Others emphasize emotional and social experiences of young girls from a 
psychoanalytic perspective and attribute women's connectedness to the fact that, unlike boys, girls do 
not have to reject their mothers. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF 
MOTHERING 167 (1978) (exploring the different effects of the Oedipus complex on boys and girls). 
92. See generally NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL 
EDUCATION (1984); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
93. Difference feminists have been accused of ignoring differences among women. For 
instance, women of color have felt that the feminist movement represents only white, middle-class 
women, "the pampered oppressed" (to use a phrase of Alice Walker's) who do not have to deal with 
the complicating factors of race and poverty. Some lesbians feel ignored and alienated by difference 
feminists' emphasis on childbirth and nursing in describing women's unique experience and 
connectedness. See generally ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF 
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST HOUGHT (1988); Cain, supra note 87; Angela P. Harris, Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). 
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women tend to rely on "webs of interconnectedness."''94 Difference 
feminists identify the masculine voice as one that settles disputes 
through organized conflict such as war or litigation.95 The feminine 
voice, on the other hand, approaches problems through consensus 
building.96 In light of women's focus on relationships, the feminine 
voice tends to eschew abstract rights-based arguments9 and instead pre- 
fers to immerse itself in the particulars of problems, seeking context- 
based solutions.98 Difference feminists affirmatively recognize and even 
celebrate these unique ways of thinking, knowing, and relating. 
94. GILLIGAN, supra note 92, at 24-36, quoted and discussed in Bender, supra note 86, at 28- 
30. Almost all feminists agree that personal relationships and connections with other people form an 
important aspect of women's experience. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L 
REV. 1, 14 (1988) ("Underlying both radical and cultural feminism is a conception of women's 
existential state that is grounded in women's potential for physical, material connection to human 
life .... "). 
95. As Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow notes in Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a 
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 50-51 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel- 
Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice], the adversary system relies on a strict hierarchy and a clash of 
rights, ultimately dividing the parties into categories of winners and losers. Professor Leslie Bender 
contends that the adversary system is "[i]n many ways ... an intellectualized substitute for duelling or 
medieval jousting. Much of legal practice is a win-lose performance, full of one-upmanship and 
bravado." Bender, supra note 2, at 7. The culture of the adversary system and the evidence rules 
themselves promote a gaming atmosphere. See Kinports, supra note 2, at 426-27. The language of 
advocacy is gendered and bellicose, full of sports and war analogies and "masculine" imagery. See, 
e.g., EMILY COURIC, THE TRIAL LAWYERS: THE NATION'S TOP LITIGATORS TELL How THEY WIN 
ix (1988) (referring to trial lawyers as "the shock troops of the legal profession"). 
Some feminists have rejected the notion that litigation and adversariness is per se male and 
have examined feminist principles for litigation. For example, Menkel-Meadow has revisited her 
position in the Portia articles in a piece entitled Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism and 
Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75, 86-97 (1994) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia 
Redux], in which she claims that although women may first turn to negotiation and consensus, they 
also have the skills of the adversary system, including sharp lawyering and technical interpretations. 
96. See DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND 149-87 (1990) (discussing 
women's tendency to avoid direct conflict and to try to maintain consensus and cohesion within a 
group); see also Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 95, at 40 (summarizing 
psychological and sociological research that "has postulated that women grow up in the world with a 
more relational and affiliational concept of self than do men"). 
97. Professor Katharine Bartlett addresses the general claim "that women approach the 
reasoning process differently than men do." According to Bartlett, the argument runs that women are 
"more sensitive to situation and context, that they resist universal principles and generalizations, 
especially those that do not fit their own experiences, and that they believe that 'the practicalities of 
everyday life' should not be neglected for the sake of abstract justice." Bartlett, supra note 88, at 
377. Professor Bartlett is clearly skeptical of these claims. She notes that "this reasoning process has 
taken on normative significance for feminists." Id. Bartlett rightly points out that feminist method 
requires the process of abstraction. See id. at 380. It is not the process of abstraction but rather the 
absence of practical reasoning, and the failure to integrate emotion and experience with logic that the 
feminist method tries to redress. See id. 
98. See TANNEN, supra note 96, at 91 (discussing "women's tendency to use personal 
experience and examples, rather than abstract argumentation"); Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal 
Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of 
Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613, 620 (1986) (noting that "[t]ime and again women have found that their 
own experiences are more valuable truth-seeking tools than the abstractions of others"); Menkel- 
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Difference feminism has been assailed on many fronts, including 
challenges by liberals who insist on precise parity" and by those who 
bristle at the notion that women have somehow cornered the market on 
caring, contextualized judgment."X Difference feminism, however, re- 
jects "equality" as a sterile and ultimately unfair precept, because it 
does not account for women's experiences and mindset."0' Moreover, in 
response to the criticism that difference feminists have arrogated to 
themselves all the desirable, "cuddly" qualities, it is important to note 
that difference feminism, though not the exclusive proponent of the 
values inherent in the ethic of care, has nevertheless been the primary 
force in bringing such values to bear on legal doctrine and legal culture. 
This contribution of feminism and feminist scholarship is significant 
Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 95, at 48 (discussing the works of Carol Gilligan and 
Nel Noddings, and observing that "[m]en focus on universal abstract principles like justice, equality 
and fairness o that their world is safe, predictable and constant. Women solve problems by seeking 
to understand the context and relationships involved and understand that universal rules may be 
impossible."); Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 95, at 80 (reviewing the more recent data 
and asserting that "most men, and about one-third of women, reason from rational, abstract principles 
or rules, like a weighing of competing rights. Women are more likely, though not exclusively, to 
reason from a care perspective that relies on notions of responsibility, human connection, and care.") 
(footnote omitted). See generally MARY FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (1986) (discussing women's methods of gaining 
knowledge and information). 
99. Such criticism comes from people who are skeptical of the existence of different voices 
and who are wary of citing differences, even if they do exist. They believe that the women's 
movement should focus on attaining equality of treatment and opportunity. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, 
The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 453, 458 (David Kairys ed., 1990) (noting that the rejection 
of the "sexualization of the dualisms" of rational and irrational, active and passive, etc., "is often 
accompanied by ... a disruption of conventional sex roles"). Feminists who focus on equality are 
concerned with losing ground on issues of equal pay and glass ceilings if women are branded as 
"different,", even if that difference is not necessarily perceived by feminists as bad. The fear is that 
difference feminism, which emphasizes values of nurturing and empathy, may inadvertently polarize 
the sexes and reinforce beliefs that are used to justify the oppression of women. See, e.g., Anne M. 
Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 90-91 (1994) (arguing that the ethic of care 
obscures "feminist efforts to clarify our understanding of gender as a patriarchially constructed 
hierarchy of social differences and behavioral expectations"); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing 
Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989) (arguing that Gilligan's construction of gender reinforces 
restrictive and regressive stereotypes of the domestic nurturing woman); Joan Williams, Gender 
Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1565-71 (1991) (arguing 
that Gilligan's difference feminism reinforces "neatly matched binary opposites integral to the covert 
gendering of the liberal pursuit of autonomy," and also diffuses any challenge to the system that 
precludes women from pursuing unconventionally autonomous paths). 
100. See John M. Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender 
Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc. REs. 597, 635-36 (1983) (criticizing 
Gilligan's binary logic and sharp contrasts between "male" and "female," and exposing the 
"crossovers" documented even in Gilligan's own interviews). 
101. For instance, "equal" disability leave makes no sense where only women bear and nurse 
children. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1285 
(1987) (arguing that male and female "differences," perceived or real, biological or social, should be 
costless). Cf Cain, supra note 87, at 199 ("Women are most noticeably not like men when they are 
pregnant."). 
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whether or not one believes an "ethic of care" is innately or uniquely 
feminine. 
Perhaps the most telling critique of difference feminism, however, 
emerges from "dominance" feminism, the second branch of feminism 
considered in this Article. Dominance feminism focuses on the power 
differential between women and men. It analyzes women's place in so- 
ciety by examining male subjugation of women, focusing particularly 
on sex and sexuality. Professor Kathryn Abrams has described domi- 
nance feminism as "that strand of feminist (legal) theory that locates 
gender oppression in the sexualized domination of women by men and 
the eroticization of that dominance through pornography and other 
elements of popular culture.""'02 Women's subjugation does not stem 
solely from discrimination or society's failure to appreciate women's 
roles and perspectives.1'3 Rather, dominance feminism traces women's 
oppression to threats to women's safety and physical integrity. For 
dominance feminists, the organizing icon is not woman as mother, but 
woman as survivor of sexual violence and member of a subjugated 
class."04 
Dominance feminists, concerned about the perpetuation of gender 
stereotypes and the unwitting division of a complicated political struggle 
into "sugar and spice" on the one hand, and "snails and puppy dog's 
tails" on the other, reject many of the tenets of difference feminism.1'5 
Dominance feminists worry that focusing on differences will merely 
102. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 304, 304 n.l (1995). 
103 Cf Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 63, 80-81 
(1993) (arguing that a focus on women's differences "shifts attention away from asking about the 
institutional and cultural structures that create a norm and generate those differences"). 
104. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 149 
(1989) ("[A]ll women live all the time under the shadow of the threat of sexual abuse."). 
105. Although dominance feminists realize the importance of supporting women, and believe 
that celebration of difference is a necessary step forward, they do not believe that women should be 
mired in gender-based stereotypes. No matter how positive those attributes are, as is the case with 
women's nurturing nature and empathy, they are also associated with subjugation. As Catharine 
MacKinnon has argued, 
Beloved of left and right alike, construing gender as a difference, termed simply the gender 
difference, obscures and legitimatizes the way gender is imposed by force. It hides that 
force behind a static description of gender as a biological or social or mythic or semantic 
partition, engraved or inscribed or inculcated by god, nature, society (agents unspecified), 
the unconscious, or the cosmos. The idea of gender difference helps keep the reality of 
male dominance in place. 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 3 (1987). MacKinnon also wrote: 
The differences we attribute to sex are lines inequality draws, not any kind of basis for 
it. Social and political inequality are, I think, basically indifferent to sameness and 
difference. Differences are inequality's post hoc excuse, its conclusory artifact, its 
outcome presented as its origin, the damage that is pointed to as the justification for doing 
the damage after the damage has been done, the distinctions that perception is socially 
organized to notice because inequality gives them consequences for social power. 
Id. at 8. 
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provide fodder for those who wish to subjugate women. For them, cele- 
bration of women's ethic of care echoes traditional excuses for sexism 
that relied on some of the same qualities but used them to argue that 
women are too anecdotal, emotional, or spiritual for active participation 
in public life. Dominance feminists argue further that the "different 
voice" perpetuates male power by objectifying a male prototype and 
establishing it as the norm from which women are supposedly different. 
Focusing on women's necessary coping mechanisms in an oppressive 
patriarchal society,'06 dominance feminists tend to see women's con- 
nectedness not as innate or socially desirable, but as a consequence of 
oppression. Women are nurturing because they have been forced and 
trained to be helpful, subservient, and sexually submissive to men.'17 
Dominance feminists assert that women's voices are not different, but 
muted, speaking in the whisper of subjugation. 
Despite this serious disagreement, both strands of feminism are 
concerned with many of the same practical issues. Even though domi- 
nance feminists see identifiable gender differences as a cause for revo- 
lution, not celebration, they share with difference feminists a 
commitment to heeding women's stories and addressing the practical 
problems that women face. Ultimately, both strands provide valuable 
tools for analyzing law as it applies to these practical issues. Difference 
feminism focuses on how law may not reflect or value the "different" 
ways women perceive and react, no matter how these differences origi- 
nate. Dominance feminism, which searches for power discrepancies 
between men and women, is particularly concerned with women's 
physical safety and personal integrity. It analyzes how law may stifle or 
silence women.'08 
106. Catherine MacKinnon, the predominant dominance feminist, questioned Carol Gilligan 
about women's nurturance and ethics of care: 
Why do women become these people, more than men, who represent these values? This is 
really very important. For 
me,.... 
the answer is the subordination of women. That does not 
mean that I would throw out those values. Those are nice values; everyone should have 
them.... 
What bothers me is identifying women with it. ... I am troubled by the possibility of women 
identifying with what is a positively valued feminine stereotype. 
Dubois, et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 
74 (1985). 
107. See supra notes 105-106; cf Kathy Alexis Psomiades, The Daughter's Dilemma: Family 
Process and the Nineteenth-Century Domestic Novel, 20 SIGNs 189, 190 (1994) (book review) 
(criticizing an author who "tends to take women's culture at face value as an eternally true natural 
force connected to women's biological and cultural role in nurturance"). 
108. Dominance feminists focus particularly on rape, pornography, harassment, and 
reproductive freedom, areas where inequality arises out of men's treatment of women's bodies. See 
Lisa R. Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 183, 198 (1994) 
(explaining focus of MacKinnon's theory on legal contexts such as obscenity, rape, and reproductive 
freedom). Influenced by Marxism, dominance feminists also focus on economic differences, noting 
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Both strands of feminism also question the notion of "objective" 
rules.1" So-called objective rules promote a male archetype and demote 
women to the position of an irrational other."' Feminists reject the no- 
tion of "objectivity" because it assumes the existence of unsituated 
knowledge. Difference feminism identifies unsituated knowledge with 
male relational styles, while dominance feminism identifies the concept 
with male power. Nevertheless, both argue that the law's traditional reli- 
ance on the objectivity and neutrality of legal rules cloaks the oppres- 
sion of women."' They argue that any attempt to identify neutral 
reality or objective truth is fruitless, and that the assumptions underlying 
the goals of objectivity and neutrality are not only unfounded, but in- 
evitably reflect gender power differences."2 
The feminist critique of neutrality and objectivity is particularly 
important for a discussion of evidence law, because evidence law rests 
that women's lack of political power reflects their dependent economic status. See generally 
MACKINNON, supra note 105, at 48-49 (analogizing Marxist perspective to dominance feminism). 
109. This tendency to believe that there exists an objective reality is certainly not unique to 
evidence law. As Leslie Bender writes, "Western culture teaches us that the patriarchal description 
of reality is not biased but neutral; that our knowledge and truths are not subjective, intersubjective, 
relative, or constructed from narrow perspectives but objective, scientifically based and 
universal . . . ." (footnote omitted). Bender, supra note 86, at 9. 
110. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 100, at 72-74 (noting that Cartesian epistemology equates 
knowledge with masculinity and the "thing known"-the object of knowledge-with femininity). 
Although a critique of neutral principles seems old-hat within the academy, it has not filtered its way 
into the understanding or practice of evidence law. Trial lawyers may plan strategies about whether 
it is better to have a woman as a juror or a man as an expert witness, but advocates have not 
generally questioned the neutrality of the rules themselves. Evidence law tends to be very practical, 
which explains in part why until very recently so little of the current, very theoretical, jurisprudential 
debate has influenced thinking about evidence. See generally Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic 
Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 995 (1994). 
111. Feminist epistemology offers aid to anyone challenging the notions of "neutral" evidence 
rules. As Professor Susan Williams explains, however, feminists cannot be satisfied with merely 
proving the subjectivity and indeterminacy of neutral rules. See Williams, supra note 100, at 83 
(noting that social constructionism ay threaten women's political organizing by "decentering" the 
concept of "woman" and focusing on critique rather than transformation). Hand in hand with its 
critique of neutral principles, feminism operates from the axiom that oppression of women, or indeed 
of any unjustly subjugated oppressed group, is a social evil. See generally id. Social constructionism 
and post-modernism, as well as certain communitarian theories, also challenge the assumption that 
one can shed one's particularistic self and somehow engage pure logic to discover "the truth." See 
id. at 69 (noting the social constructionist argument that "there are no 'brute facts' to which human 
beings have access independent of their culturally contingent conceptual categories"). Feminism, 
however, adds unique elements in criticizing purportedly neutral rules, because feminists cannot 
adhere to the nihilistic unbridled relativism that some other critiques of Cartesianism generate. 
Feminist epistemology focuses on a particular excluded group: women. Feminism cannot tolerate all 
approaches as equally legitimate, or else it would have to tolerate the subjugation of women as one 
legitimate option. As Catherine MacKinnon has written, "feminism neither claims universality nor, 
failing that, reduces to relativity." Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the 
State, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 88, at 183. 
112. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 12 (1992) ("Neutral treatment in a gendered world or within a gendered 
institution does not operate in a neutral manner."). 
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upon an unspoken assumption that neutral rules and objective truth ex- 
ist, and are accessible to the reasoning thinker who ignores emotion and 
other distractions."3 In applying feminist theory to evidence law, Pro- 
fessor Kit Kinports has noted that the reliance on logic and experience 
in evidence law presupposes a neutral vantage point and universal iden- 
tity of experience.u4 Kinports cites the rules of relevance, which, ac- 
cording to the advisory notes, avowedly rely on "logic" and 
"experience," as one example of evidence law's faith in its own objec- 
tivity."'5 Without questioning or even noticing any of the underlying 
cultural assumptions, the rules of evidence imply that a social consensus 
exists about issues of logic and causation, and that members of society 
share largely similar experiences. 
Even modem interdisciplinary evidence scholarship is subject to 
this critique. Although evidence scholars have been slow to learn from 
other disciplines,"6 one key area in which interdisciplinary scholarship 
113. Evidence scholarship has been criticized for perpetuating the fiction of neutrality and 
assuming the rationality of factfinders. See WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING 
EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 71-77 (1990) (discussing the optimism in evidence law about the 
rationality of the judicial process). Twining has opined that evidence scholarship is generally 
"remarkably unsceptical in respect of its basic assumptions." Id. See generally WILLIAM TWINING, 
THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985) [hereinafter TWINING, THEORIES OF 
EVIDENCE]. As Rosemary Hunter explains, 
[T]he rules of evidence clearly embody Enlightenment epistemology. They privilege fact 
over value, reason over emotion, presence over absence, physical over psychological, 
perception over intuition. They are part of the same discursive regime of hierarchized 
dualisms that imparts greater cultural value to the masculine than to the feminine, partly 
through the association of "masculine" with attributes uch as reason, presence, and 
perception and of "feminine" with emotion, absence, and intuition. 
Hunter, supra note 2, at 129-30 (footnotes omitted); see also Stewart supra note 16, at 8 (evidence 
law reflects "more than a small touch of a highly rationalistic view of man"). 
114. See Kinports, supra note 2, at 431 (quoting Martha Minow and noting that although 
apparently neutral, relevance of evidence is "in the eye of the beholder"). 
115 Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence deem evidence relevant if it has "any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without he evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. This relevance standard is 
explained in the advisory committee's notes directing judges to rely on "principles evolved by 
experience or science, applied logically to the situation at hand." FED R. EvID. 401 advisory 
committee's note. 
116. See William Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in WELL AND 
TRULY TRIED: ESSAYS ON EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF SIR RICHARD EGGLESTON 211 (Enid Campbell 
& Louis Waller eds., 1982) (noting a revival of interest by evidence scholars in interdisciplinary 
scholarship where previously the study of evidence has been in "isolation"); Roger C. Park, Evidence 
Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN. L. REV. 849, 849 (1991) ("The best-known interdisciplinary 
movements have, however, had little or no influence on evidence scholarship."); Seigel, supra note 
110, at 995 (arguing that "the major intellectual movements characterizing legal thought during the 
latter quarter of the twentieth century-including critical legal studies .. and practical legal 
studies.. .-have left evidence scholarship virtually untouched"). Recently, however, scholars have 
begun expanding the very narrow and rule-based evidence scholarship. See Judy Cornett, The 
Treachery of Perception: Evidence and Experience in Clarissa, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 165, 168 (1994) 
(examining the evidentiary issues raised in Samuel Richardson's novel, Clarissa, from an 
interdisiplinary perspective); Seigel, supra note 110 (utilizing the philosophy of pragmatism to critique 
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has flourished is the "new evidence" movement, which uses Bayesian 
probability theory to analyze questions of inference, proof, and the ad- 
missibility of hearsay."7 Like older evidence scholarship, however, these 
probabilistic models invite a feminist critique because they reinforce 
rather than undermine the detached, "objective" view of evidence. The 
emphasis on quantification and abstract mathematical models devalues 
the human aspects of discernment, including judgment, experience, and 
intuition."8 Not surprisingly, the new evidence movement has been 
criticized as conflicting with feminist methods and principles."19 
B. "He Said, She Said"-Toward a Feminist 
Critique of the Hearsay Rule 
Although this Article focuses on a feminist critique of an exception 
to the hearsay rule, it will briefly discuss possible avenues of feminist 
critique of hearsay as a whole. This analysis invites further thought and 
comment, but also serves as a precursor to the feminist critique of the 
excited utterance exception. To understand the significance of the ex- 
ception, it is imperative that we analyze the rule from which it deviates. 
By scanning hearsay law for a bias against the ethic of care, a femi- 
nist analysis could examine how the hearsay rule subverts relationships 
in and out of the courtroom. A feminist critique could also challenge 
the underlying rationale, construction, and application of the hearsay 
rule, highlighting its rigidity and its failure to account for cultural and 
gender bias. By probing for ways in which women's experiences and 
voices are ignored, a feminist critique could challenge the wisdom and 
the neutrality of the hearsay rule. 
First, regarding its effects on relationships, the hearsay rule can be 
criticized for reinforcing unequal relationships and disempowering or- 
dinary citizens. In contrast to an ethic of care, the hierarchical nature of 
the rule separates attorneys from clients, and divides courtroom officers 
from jurors. The hearsay rule-the secret handshake of the legal pro- 
evidence scholarship); Wellborn, supra note 12 (summarizing social science materials, particuarly 
from psychology, and suggesting appropriate legal responses). 
117. See Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 
B.U. L. REV. 439, 441 (1986); Peter Tillers, Intellectual History, Probability, and the Law of 
Evidence, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1465-66 (1993) (reviewing SHAPIRO, supra note 1). 
118. This criticism does not advocate that evidence should abandon modem science to help 
establish facts. Rather, it raises the concern that the mathematical formulas and logical proofs that 
allegedly model and predict reliability could supplant, rather than describe, the human elements of 
decision-making. 
119. See generally Symposium, Decision and Influence in Litigation, 13 CARDOzo L. REV. 253 
(1991); L.H. LaRue, Stories Versus Theories at the Cardozo Evidence Conference: It's Just Another 
Metaphor to Me, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 121-23 (1992) (noting that probabilistic theories have 
been criticized as overly theoretical, acontextual, and non-representative of how jurors (or any one 
else, for that matter) make decisions). 
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fession-mystifies lay people and serves to "alienat[e] them from the 
trial process."120 It perpetuates the power of a professional elite whose 
knowledge of its arcane rules makes lawyers indispensable, if incompre- 
hensible.121 The hearsay rule, therefore, impedes connection or under- 
standing. It serves to reinforce hierarchy and to perpetuate reliance on 
courtroom professionals, who tend to be predominantly male.122 
Because the hearsay rule divides the jury from the actors in the 
know, the judge, the parties, and the witnesses all possess more informa- 
tion than they may reveal to the jury. As noted above, the hearsay rule 
rests on the assumption that formal, in-court, sworn testimony subjected 
to cross-examination is more trustworthy than out-of-court statements.123 
Although trustworthiness i not the only justification for prohibiting 
hearsay, and arguments based on the social value and political right to 
confrontation and cross-examination abound,'"2 the primary argument 
120. Kinports, supra note 2, at 425; see id. at 423-25 (discussing the complexity of evidence law 
in general and noting the "baffl[ing]" question of defining hearsay). 
121. Lawyers who have learned the intricate matrix of the hearsay rules have little incentive to 
alter the system or reduce its mystique. See Ronald J. Allen, Commentary: A Response to Professor 
Friedman: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN. L. REV. 797, 801-02 
(1992) (discussing the "potentially scandalous justification" for maintaining the hearsay rule-that it 
"protects the competitive advantage of those who know it"); Nance, supra note 9, at 284 n.274 
(discussing the "real reasons for the Hearsay" Rule, including the "intellectual investment and a 
valuably exclusive expertise" of trial lawyers (quoting Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference 
in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 56 (D. Lerner ed., 1959))); Stewart, supra note 16, at 2 
(noting the rejection of the Model Code of Evidence, which virtually abandoned the hearsay rule). 
122. According to the American Bar Association, of 896,000 licensed lawyers in 1994, 23% 
were women. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, 
WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 3, 29, 54 (1995). Although there has been a 
noticeable increase in female judges, as of 1991 only 9% of all judges were female. See id. at 29, 51. 
For other statistics on women in the legal profession, see Shirley S. Abrahamson, Toward a Courtroom 
of One's Own: An Appellate Court Judge Looks at Gender Bias, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1209, 1216 
(noting that there is only one woman on the governing board of the National Board of Trial 
Advocates, that "only two percent of the lawyers certified by NBTA were women," and that of the 
52 lawyers certified in Wisconsin, none were women); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Symposium: The 
Future of the Legal Profession: Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the 
Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 621, 652 n. 150 
(1994) (noting that women are disproportionately underrepresented in bar leadership positions); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 58 ("Women account 
for close to forty-five percent of new entrants to the profession, and over twenty percent of all 
lawyers, but only about eleven percent of the partners in the nation's 250 largest firms, eight percent 
of the federal bench, sixteen percent of the full professors in law schools, and seven percent of the 
law school deans.") (citations omitted). Although women make up approximately 40% of all 
managers, women hold only 5-7% of senior executive positions. See GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING 
FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL: FACT FINDING REPORT OF THE FEDERAL GLASS 
CEILING COMMISSION 151 (Mar. 16, 1995), quoted in Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in 
Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971, 
977 n.21 (1995). 
123. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
124. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three- 
Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 626 (1992) (suggesting that societal 
dimension of confrontation clause should be given more weight by courts). 
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against hearsay evidence rests upon the assumption that it is danger- 
ously unreliable. The hearsay rule functions as a screening mechanism 
for jurors who are presumed to be unwilling or unable to weigh the 
trustworthiness of information appropriately.'25 In this way, hearsay 
demonstrates deep disrespect for the jurors' intelligence and common 
sense.126 
Second, the hearsay rule can be criticized for its complexity, rigid- 
ity, and lack of reliance on context. Aside from the residual or "catch- 
all" exceptions, 27 the hearsay exceptions operate in rigid, highly for- 
malistic categories:'28 excited utterance, state of mind, recorded recol- 
lection, business records, dying declaration, and so forth.29 In practical 
terms, the hearsay rule and its many exceptions present an all-or- 
nothing choice. The out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted must conform to an exception or will be excluded, 
even if the statement is highly probative, seems trustworthy given the 
surrounding circumstances, and sheds unique light on the case. Con- 
versely, if the hearsay statement fits within an exception, the evidence is 
admissible, no matter how untrustworthy the statement may appear.'03 
Although the parameters of the hearsay exceptions have been drawn 
with reliability in mind, they leave little room for arguing in a specific 
case that the evidence is in fact reliable.131 The organization of the hear- 
say rule and its exceptions restricts analysis of statements in context and 
instead may admit untrustworthy evidence just because it happens to fit 
125. But cf Cornett, supra note 116, at 181-182 (noting that depriving an individual of multiple 
sources of information rendered the individual's judgment unreliable). 
126. Although the criticism that hearsay ignores common sense is certainly not new, the focus on 
relationships as part of practical reason is a unique contribution of feminism. As discussed below, 
jurors may not be ideal factfinders, but there is no reason to believe judges, who are still 
predominately privileged males, are any better. 
127. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). 
128. For a benign view of the category approach, see Terree E. Foster, Present Sense 
Impressions: An Analysis and a Proposal, Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 301 (1979) (explaining that 
"exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay have been carved for categories of statements which, as a 
class, neutralize one or more of the risks associated with unprobed testimony"). 
129. See FED. R. EVID. 803. 
130. See Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1339, 
1347-54 (1987) (criticizing the categorical approach). Of course the hearsay ban is only one hurdle 
within the framework of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although an evidentiary fact may be 
admissible under the hearsay rule or qualify under one of the exceptions, the trial court may 
ultimately exclude the evidence under Rule 403. Under Rule 403, the trier of fact may exclude 
relevant evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. 
131. Only the residuals, statements against interest (in criminal trials) and the business and public 
records exceptions provide an independent screen for trustworthiness. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6), 
803(8), 804(3). Elsewhere, Judge Becker and I have argued that all hearsay should be subjected to 
trustworthiness analysis. See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 42, at 906-09. 
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within a categorical exception. Such obstruction and rigid acontextual 
categories are inimical to the feminine voice.'32 
Third, on a substantive level, a feminist method can question the 
hearsay rule for its resulting loss of information and silencing of voices 
outside the formal courtroom setting. Hearsay evidence requires fact- 
finders to rely on what people said out of court, and therefore draws on 
jurors' own experience, judgment, and intuition concerning the useful- 
ness of such out-of-court statements. As a practical matter, the hearsay 
rule's screening function means less evidence is available to the jury. 
Less evidence means less information and context. The hearsay bar 
robs jurors of a traditional device for learning about the world: hear- 
say.133 Furthermore, the type of evidence being lost is particularly im- 
portant to women's traditional modes of communication and hence 
relevant to a feminist critique. Much excluded hearsay evidence con- 
sists of informal communication-gossip, casual statements to friends, 
on-the-scene-observations-as opposed to formal and formalized in- 
court sworn testimony. 
This very type of evidence is crucial to women's oral traditions. 
Both difference and dominance feminists agree that women are more 
likely to develop non-traditional, informal networks of information 
(whether because of difference-based socialization, natural affinity, or 
lack of power). In the same vein, the attainment, dissemination, and 
evaluation of such second-hand information tends to fall within the 
132. Professor Eleanor Swift has proposed a contextualized and fact-sensitive approach to 
hearsay reform. See Swift, supra note 130. Swift argues that these "categorical exceptions are 
substantive generalizations not formulated by the trier of fact, but drafted by judges and legislators to 
represent their collective beliefs about what kinds of hearsay statements are more likely to be 
reliable." Id. at 1351. She highlights the fact that hearsay exceptions, premised on notions of 
trustworthiness or some functional equivalent of cross-examination, result in a mechanical and 
uncontextualized application of the exclusion. See id. at 1350-54. 
Swift offers an intriguing, if unwieldy, alternative that addresses the problem of hearsay in 
functional terms. See id. at 1341. Her foundation fact approach "obligates the proponent of hearsay 
to produce a foundation witness" who would testify about the circumstances surrounding the 
declarant's testimony, including the declarant's "process of perceiving, remembering, and making a 
statement about a relevant event." Id. at 1342. By providing this background information, Swift's 
proposal bypasses the abstract and rigid categories and instead focuses on the context in which the 
statements were made. With the additional information, jurors can evaluate the hearsay and rely on 
common sense means of determining reliability. Swift's approach has been lauded as innovative and 
refreshing. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of 
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REv. 367, 402 (1992) (referring to Swift's proposal as "striking and 
original"). Swift's focus on context and her disavowal of abstract provisions in favor of contextual 
knowledge and informed practical decision making is feminist in approach, if not in name. 
133. See infra Part III.C. As McCormick notes, "[m]uch of our learning comes in the form of 
hearsay." McCormick, supra note 7, ? 245, at 428. In a philosophical sense, all information is 
acquired through hearsay because to evaluate any piece of evidence, we must rely on statements 
made by parents and teachers who helped us understand the world around us. In fact, banning this 
type of hearsay learning would be "epistemologically suicidal." Mary Morton, The Hearsay Rule and 
Epistemological Suicide, 74 GEo. L. J. 1301, 1305 (1986). 
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practical experiences of women. Informal out-of-court statements are 
arguably more typical of women's different voice. Historically, women 
were deprived of political information, newspapers, and even literacy, 
and instead developed more informal methods, such as gossip and word 
of mouth, to learn about their worlds.T" To survive, women had to de- 
velop acute sensitivity to the moods and meanings of the people around 
them, and interpret events second-hand.3"" Yet, such analytic tools are 
underutilized in a formal courtroom atmosphere, where the bar against 
hearsay controls. The hearsay prohibition, therefore, sacrifices poten- 
tially useful information packaged in a form familiar to and comfort- 
able for women. 
C. Considering the Rights of Criminal Defendants 
Feminist arguments against hearsay are intriguing, yet they pose 
many difficult problems of practical application and theoretical consis- 
tency. A solution to the problems posed by the hearsay rule seems elu- 
sive, particularly in criminal cases, where the cumbersome, formal 
requirements are designed, in part, to protect criminal defendants.'36 
Certainly the hearsay rule would benefit from less jargon and a simpler 
structure. The feminist critique of hearsay outlined above, however, 
seems to demand more dramatic changes, many of which would un- 
fairly disadvantage those accused of crimes. 
A feminist call for case-specific determinations of admissibility of 
individual hearsay statements would be unfair to criminal defendants, 
134. See Deborah Jones, Gossip: Notes on Women's Oral Culture, 3 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L Q. 
193, 194 (1980) (defining gossip as an intimate personal style of discourse among women that serves 
in part as an informal communication network); id. at 197 ("Gossip is a staple of women's lives and 
the study of gossip is the study of women's concerns and values, a key to female subculture."); cf 
Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of 
American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229, 349-50 (1994) (comparing the traditional 
white Protestant male emphasis on visual imagery with the aural metaphors and traditions of (among 
others) women, African-Americans, and Jews, and noting the importance of "voice," hearing, and 
story to critical legal scholars). Certainly men gossip too, and less powerful people engage 
disproportionately in such informal methods of communication. See id. ("Compared to men, 
American women as a group have historically shared a greater proportion of their knowledge, 
experiences, and thoughts with one another by talking and listening, telling stories, and engaging in 
the intimate, detailed dialogue that men have pejoratively called 'gossip."') (citations omitted). But, 
as the heroine, Anne Elliot, proclaims in Jane Austen's Persuasion, "Men have had every advantage 
of us in telling their own story. Education has been theirs in so much higher a degree .... " JANE 
AUSTEN, PERSUASION 230 (Zodiac Press 1960) (1818). 
135. For example, in an analysis of Samuel Richardson's novel Clarissa, Judy Cornett evaluates 
the heroine's ability to draw sound inferences and organize the evidence available to her. Professor 
Cornett observes that Clarissa presented a counter-example to the rational and formalistic evidence 
theories of her day that opposed hearsay: "For Clarissa and Anna, whose freedom of movement is 
limited by social convention, hearsay is an important source of information." Cornett, supra note 116, 
at 181. 
136. See Park, supra note 9, at 54 (distinguishing the problems posed by hearsay in civil and 
criminal trials). 
196 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:159 
who need some way of predicting and preparing for the evidence used 
against them. The less powerful criminal defendants are, the less likely 
they will be able to refute hearsay. Similarly, criminal defendants who 
come from disadvantaged circumstances will be less able to marshal the 
resources to collect or generate extensive hearsay testimony of their 
own, so a relaxed hearsay rule will favor the prosecution. 
Although some feminists have occasionally joined forces with law- 
and-order advocates (for instance, in arguing for less defendant- 
protective evidence rules in cases of rape and other sexual violence),137 
by and large feminists express empathy and concern for the rights of 
criminal defendants.138 Like women, criminal defendants as a class are 
often disadvantaged in their relationship to the legal establishment and 
frequently remain unheard in the courtroom. Feminists, who champion 
empathy and connectedness, may logically conclude that they must ex- 
tend that same ethic of care to criminal defendants.139 Feminist insight 
drawn from the experience of subjugation and difference applies, there- 
fore, to disadvantaged groups, such as the poor and African Americans, 
who are disproportionately represented among the accused. 
Additionally, one might argue that the hearsay rule itself, which in 
criminal cases derives in part from the right to confront witnesses, re- 
flects an appreciation for connectedness. According to confrontation 
theory, defendants have a right to look their accusers in the eye. Al- 
though this right is largely adversarial, it also represents an intense social 
connection between two people'14 (as opposed to the trial by affidavit 
that served as the original impetus for the right to confrontation).'41 
137. Feminists have even joined with the fundamentalist Christian Right to oppose pornography. 
See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1 (1985). 
138. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L 
REV. 361, 365, 386 (1996) (noting that emotion and storytelling can serve non-feminist ends and 
arguing that despite the value currently placed on empathy and narrative, victims' statements should 
be suppressed because they "evoke emotions inappropriate in the context of criminal sentencing"); 
Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985) (discussing 
problems regarding movement in favor of victim's rights). 
139. There is a respectable argument to the contrary concerning crimes against women; 
however, as much as feminists can object to the solicitude that men accused of crimes against women 
often receive, feminists cannot jettison the presumption of innocence. 
140. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (imagining a 
scenario where a father accused of child abuse cannot "sit in the presence of the child, and ... ask, 
personally or through counsel, 'it is really not true, is it, that I-your father (or mother) whom you see 
before you-did these terrible things?"'). 
141. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (discussing the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 
who was accused of treason, based primarily upon the confession of a co-conspirator that was likely 
obtained through torture); see also JOHN GEORGE PHILLMORE, HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE 157-68 (1850). See generally Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of 
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 
(1972). 
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In sum, a feminist critique of the hearsay rule provides reason to 
distrust he hearsay rule and, of course, insight into courtroom dynam- 
ics. However, given the countervailing concerns of criminal defendants, 
feminists probably should not argue for wholesale change of the hear- 
say rule protections. More promising, from a practical perspective, is 
the feminist critique of the excited utterance exception in the next Part. 
In addition to offering theoretical challenges and cultural insights, the 
critique also suggests practical changes in the excited utterance doctrine 
that can be achieved without undue hardship on criminal defendants. 
IV 
THAT SAME OLD VOICE IS YELLING AGAIN: A FEMINIST 
CRITIQUE OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE 
The characterization of a statement as an excited utterance reflects 
social milieus and highlights political tensions; what is considered 
"exciting" is constantly changing. Perhaps what society finds exciting 
or startling as a culture is part of what distinguishes a particular age. In 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many cases involved 
excited utterances made by railroad employees about the cause of rail- 
way accidents.'42 In more recent cases, gun crimes, automobile acci- 
dents, and emergency 911 calls figure prominently.'43 Throughout the 
history of the doctrine, rape and other sexual violence, woman-battering, 
and child abuse examples arise repeatedly.'44 
This Part employs a feminist method to challenge the wisdom and 
fairness of the excited utterance exception, exposing some of the basic 
but hidden assumptions concerning how we, as a society, amass evidence 
and judge credibility, especially in cases of sexual assault. A feminist 
142. In part, this was because under the agency law of the day that influenced evidence law, 
railway workers were not able to make admissions on behalf of their employers. See, e.g., Vicksburg 
& Meridian R.R. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99, 106 (1886) (considering statement describing conversation 
with engineer after train accident); Walters v. Spokane Int'l Ry. Co., 108 P. 593 (Wash. 1910) 
(evaluating statement by railway conductor regarding train derailment). 
143. On incidents involving guns, see, e.g., United States v. Sewell, 88 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 
1996) (evaluating excited utterance made while declarant saw carjacker put gun to victim's head); 
People v. Guam, 69 F.3d 369 (9th Cir. 1995) (evaluating excited utterance made minutes after gun 
pointed at declarant's head). For cases involving auto accidents, see, e.g., Tackett v. State, 670 
S.W.2d 824 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (holding excited utterance by accident victim who later died 
admissible for proving manslaughter and leaving scene of accident); Lovato v. Herrman, 685 P.2d 
240, 241 (Colo. 1984) (holding rear end collision "qualifies as 'startling event"'). On 911 calls, see, 
e.g., Admissibility of Tape-Recording or Transcript of "911" Emergency Telephone Calls, 3 A.L.R.5th 
784; cases include State v. Guizzotti, 803 P.2d 808 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 
144. Professors Mueller and Kirkpatick have noted the special relationship between excited 
utterances and victim's statements. "[T]he startling event is often an accident or violent crime that 
injures or claims the life of the speaker: Often he was in the best position to see and report, and 
excluding his statement would mean doing without good evidence and would have the unattractive 
consequence of shutting out the cries of the victim." MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24, ? 
8.35, at 1217. 
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method raises many questions about the excited utterance excep- 
tion: Why does the law assume that everyone manifests stress in the 
same way? Who is likely to report immediately? Why do some people 
delay? Why is such delay assumed to be evidence of lying? Who is de- 
scribed by the excited utterance conception of stress? Who is excluded? 
Finally, what explains the longevity of the doctrine, particularly in light 
of the powerful psychological critique that diminished perception may 
render excited utterances less trustworthy? 
A. The Myth of Universal Experience 
The excited utterance exception allows certain excited statements to 
be admitted as substantive evidence and elevates these out-of-court 
statements to the status of competent evidence. It thereby implicitly 
deems such statements and, arguably, those who uttered them, more reli- 
able. As a logical matter, the exception also denigrates statements out- 
side its purview, deeming such statements, and the speakers who made 
them, insufficiently trustworthy. The doctrine therefore favors sponta- 
neous, visibly agitated speakers over other more quiescent, reflective, 
frozen, or passive ones. By privileging immediate, excited cries, the ex- 
cited utterance contributes, albeit subtly, to our cultural and legal defi- 
nition of credibility.'45 
Wigmore's own justification of the excited utterance exception 
provides a good starting point for a feminist critique of the doctrine.'46 
Wigmore rationalized the excited utterance rule as grounded in experi- 
ence. He argued that the excited utterance "is based on our experience 
145. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
2151 (1995) (noting general tendency of criminal law to favor male concerns and male 
perspectives). Schulhofer critiques the radical feminist view that "even-handed inaction is 
nonetheless an affirmative policy that contributes to the subordination of women." Id. at 2161. 
146. Interestingly, Wigmore, the chief proponent of the excited utterance exception, was 
adamant in his suspicion of women. In his treatise, Wigmore advocated that the court should delve 
into the mental health of all female complainants in rape cases. Wigmore was convinced that 
"female types of excessive or perverted sexuality" would dream up "imaginary sex incidents of 
which the narrator is the heroine or the victim." 3A Wigmore, supra note 11, ? 924a. He expressed 
concern for the "real victim," that is to say, the "innocent man." Id. Unsurprisingly, this view of 
survivors of rape and other sexual violence has prompted feminist comment. Although these 
assertions need no refutation, it is interesting to note that Wigmore relied on very scanty data to 
support his conclusions. See generally Leigh B. Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry 
Wigmore's Use of Scientific Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 CAL. W. L 
REV. 235 (1983). 
Wigmore's misogyny also influenced the development of excited utterance on a doctrinal level. 
Wigmore advocated strongly for additional protections on the defendant's behalf when the excited 
utterance exception arose in rape cases. He was particularly concerned about cases of 
"bootstrapping," situations in which the evidence of the rape (a necessary preliminary to establish 
stress) was proven in part through the excited utterance itself. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, 
? 1761. Because Wigmore distrusted women's rape reports, he warned against allowing the excited 
statement itself to prove the preliminary factor of an exciting event. See id. 
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that, under certain external circumstances" the "stress of nervous ex- 
citement... stills the reflective faculties. 
....'"" 
But upon whose expe- 
rience did Wigmore rely? He relied primarily on case authority (of 
dubious persuasiveness)148 to demonstrate that the excited utterance 
doctrine possessed a venerable common law pedigree. To explain the 
doctrine's logic and policy, however, Wigmore appealed to unidentified 
"experience," which he assumed everyone shared.a49 Without reflection 
or examination, Wigmore supposed that all people react to stress in the 
same way and that the excited utterance exception accurately describes 
that universal reaction.'5o 
A feminist analysis questions the various unproved and unthinking 
assumptions embedded in the doctrine, demonstrating that the excited 
utterance exception does not, and indeed cannot, rest on "universal" 
experience. Although, as noted in Part II.C, the excited utterance ex- 
ception has been criticized for its failure to account for speakers' di- 
minished perception and memory when under stress, there has been 
little challenge to the rule's basic assumptions about how stress is mani- 
fested. Underlying the excited utterance doctrine is the notion that a 
normal person affected by a deeply stressful event would, within a brief 
time, utter an agitated statement concerning the event. By probing the 
identity of this "normal person," however, we discover that our fantasy 
declarant speaks with the voice of power and privilege. 
B. Rape Trauma Syndrome and a Different Voice 
The voice encapsulated by the excited utterance does not reflect 
many women's experiences. In particular, the doctrine's implicit cul- 
tural assumptions of how "normal" and "reliable" people communi- 
cate and react to stress do not comport with the practical experience of 
survivors of rape and other sexual violence. Indeed, the actual experi- 
ence of many survivors could not be more different from the expecta- 
tions encompassed in the excited utterance. Unlike the picture 
147. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1745, at 132-33 (emphasis added) (quoting Keefe v. State, 72 
P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1937)). 
148. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing Wigmore's scholarship and his mis- 
citation and misinterpretation of important authority); see also Bienen, supra note 146, at 238 (noting 
that Wigmore looked to "academic sources which were never intended to support the propositions he 
put forward"). 
149. See Peter Tillers, Webs of Things in the Mind: A New Science of Evidence, 87 MICH. L 
REV. 1225, 1226 (1989) (discussing Wigmore's emphasis on the role of experience in determining 
relevancy). In support of the idea of a "universal" experience, Bentham declared that "experience 
is the foundation of all our knowledge." TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 113, at 29. 
In a similar vein is Justice Holmes famous dictum, "[T]he life of the law has not been logic: it has 
been experience." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
150. Although it is true that feminism values experience, feminist method debunks the 
universalist notion of "experience," recognizing that even within our culture we do not share a 
common "experience." 
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portrayed by the excited utterance exception, calling for a prompt utter- 
ance from a visibly stressed person, a victim of rape or other sexual 
violence is often numb and uncommunicative. Rape Trauma Syndrome 
("RTS") describes this experience of many survivors of rape or other 
sexual violence who experience systematic withdrawal after the 
trauma."' 
RTS documents typical behavioral manifestations of survivors of 
rape and other sexual violence.'52 Often the survivor initially suffers 
disorganization; she may be hysterical or she may be withdrawn and 
subdued. The recovery from rape and other sexual violence is a slow 
process. As the survivor beings to reorganize psychologically, she ex- 
periences classic signs of post-traumatic stress, usually nightmares, pho- 
bias, and sexual fears.'53 Only over time do most survivors process 
memories, begin to overcome the psychic numbing, and start talking to 
friends and counselors. 
Ironically, these unexcited, reflective statements--described by 
RTS-that survivors make weeks or months after the trauma are not 
admissible under the current evidentiary scheme, even though their 
typicality makes them seem particularly trustworthy."T The excited ut- 
terance exception, however, does not include these clinically observed, 
delayed, calm statements because of the time lag, as well as the declar- 
ant's lack of visible excitement.'55 The rule has the psychology back- 
151. The term was first coined by social workers Ann Burgess and Lynda Holmstrom in 1974. 
Ann Burgess & Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981
(1974). Rape Trauma Syndrome was originally designed as a psychological tool to help treat 
survivors of rape and other sexual violence, and developed as an outgrowth of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Syndrome. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ?? 9-1 
to 9-6 (2d ed. 1993). 
152. See Laura Etlinger, Comment, Social Science Research in Domestic Violence Law: A 
Proposal to Focus on Evidentiary Use, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1259, 1297 (1995) (citing recent research on 
women's reactions to rape). 
153. See Nicole Rosenberg Economou, Defense Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma 
Syndrome: Implications for the Stoic Victim, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1145-46 (1991); Deborah A. 
Dwyer, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument for Limited Admissibility, 63 
WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1988). 
154. Professors John C. Yuille and Patricia T. Tollestrup cite a case study in which a woman who 
survived a sexual assault was unable to recall any details of the event for months after the attack, 
although eventually she was able to recall most details. See John C. Yuille & Patricia T. Tollestrup, A 
Model of the Diverse Effect of Emotion on Eyewitness Memory, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMOTION 
AND MEMORY: RESEARCH AND THEORY 209 (Sven-Ake Christianson ed. 1992). There is also 
psychological evidence that traumatic events can be emblazoned on one's memory, but for this to 
happen, the survivor must first have time to process the information. This controversial phenomenon 
is dubbed "flashbulb memo[ry]." See Egeth, supra note 82, at 249. The traditional "flashbulb" 
question is "[w]here were you when you heard that Kennedy had been assassinated?" Id. Today one 
might ask, "where were you when O.J. Simpson was acquitted?" 
155. See, e.g, People v. McConnell, 358 N.W.2d 895, 896 (Mich. 1984) ("The statements made 
by the complainant to her aunt some seven days after the criminal sexual conduct allegedly occurred 
were not admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule because the statement 
did not reveal the requisite spontaneity 
...."); Fitzgerald v. United States, 412 A.2d 1, 9 (D.C. 1980), 
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wards.'56 The rationale of the excited utterance exception rests on the 
theory that sincerity is guaranteed, because the declarant did not delay, 
or because any brief delay was mitigated by the stress that precluded 
fabrication by the declarant.'57 But in fact, a rape survivor is more likely 
to be calm shortly after the incident and is more likely to delay report- 
ing the crime.s58 
vacated, 443 A.2d 1295 (D.C. 1982) (holding declaration inadmissible as excited utterance if it "loses 
the character of a spontaneous utterance... and becomes a calm narrative of a past event"); 
Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 383 A.2d 858, 863 (Pa. 1978) ("[T]he 'excited' nature of the 
utterance seems belied by the calm and unemotional manner in which they [sic] were made."). 
In State v. Chapin, 826 P.2d 194 (Wash. 1992), the court held that the statement of a male rape 
survivor did not qualify under the excited utterance exception. The court determined that he "was 
unlikely to have still been in an excited state caused by the alleged rape" when he made the statement 
"within a day or so." Id. at 198. Also, earlier in the day, before making the statement, "he had been 
calm and had engaged in his usual activities. This increases the danger of fabrication. Consequently, 
the requirement of an excited state caused by the startling event is not met . . . ." Id.; cf Baber v. 
United States, 324 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (weighing the factors creating a "borderline" case 
under the exception). 
156. The divergence between popular presumptions of how "normal" people react to trauma 
and how women actually do react is even more troubling in light of the value our system places on 
demeanor evidence. See Stewart, supra note 16, at 23 (discussing psychological evidence that 
witness accuracy does not correlate with confidence); Wellborn, supra note 12, at 1077 (exploring 
perceived importance of demeanor evidence). Although our legal culture elevates demeanor 
evidence (in fact, one prominent explanation of the hearsay rule is the factfinder's need to evaluate 
demeanor), it turns out that untrained observers such as jurors do no better than chance at detecting 
lies or evaluating the perceptive skills of witnesses. See id. at 1080-82. Often those witnesses whom 
factfinders believe are lying are merely exhibiting signs of stress, such as sweating, eyes darting, and 
fidgeting. This is called the "Othello error." (Othello killed his wife because he misread her stress 
for guilt). Id. at 1080. Worse yet, despite psychological evidence to the contrary, people are 
generally confident that they can spot liars. See id. at 1081. 
157. In United States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1989), one rape survivor "made her 
statement approximately one hour after the assault" and the other "made her statement even later." 
Id. at 1083. Both had spoken to several persons about the rape. The court explained that the women 
"had time to think about their actions and to invent an excuse about their late arrival at the dorm with 
alcohol on their breath." Id. The court ruled that the hearsay statements did not fall under the scope 
of the excited utterance exception. See id. 
158. Dwyer notes that survivors of rape and other sexual violence often delay reporting, and 
the delays are longer when the woman knows her assailant. See Dwyer, supra note 153, at 1067 n.24 
(citing SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS 
OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 188-90 (1979) (reviewing several studies indicating that "a substantial 
number of women delay reporting rape, and that the closer the relationship between the victim and 
the attacker the longer the delay)); Barbara Duffy Stewart et al., The Aftermath of Rape: Profiles of 
Immediate and Delayed Treatment Seekers, 175 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 90, 92 (1987) 
(finding that "among a sample of highly distressed women who had been raped two months to over 
three years before requesting help, nearly 73% knew their assailants, as compared with only 50% of 
immediate treatment seekers"). Dwyer postulates that feelings of intense fear and helplessness 
associated with RTS may be exaggerated when the victim knows that her assailant could find her. 
See id. 
Courts occasionally seem to acknowledge this truth. As the court explained in State v. Parker, 
730 P.2d 921 (Idaho 1986), "A sexual assault is one of the more distressing experiences a person 
could have. The distress is likely to remain bottled up in the victim until she or he can talk about what 
happened." Id. at 924. The court concluded: "Given that sexual assault crimes violate one's most 
intimate physical and mental feelings, the victim can reasonably be expected not to discuss the crime 
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Courts debate the appropriate use of RTS evidence and are par- 
ticularly reluctant o allow experts to testify that a survivor of rape or 
other sexual violence suffers from RTS in order to prove that the 
woman did not consent.'"59 Courts are more willing, however, to allow 
RTS evidence to explain delay, recantations, and seemingly normal or 
casual activities after the rape or other sexual violence."'6 This debate on 
the scope of RTS expert testimony underscores the importance of using 
the knowledge gained from RTS in more fundamental ways. One es- 
sential benefit of RTS research for evidence law stems from the infor- 
mation rule drafters can learn and apply in devising evidence rules that 
reflect the experience of survivors of rape and other sexual violence, 
and allow their voices to be heard in the courtroom. 
Rape Trauma Syndrome, therefore, serves two essential functions.'6' 
From a psychological perspective, RTS assures survivors who experience 
until meeting with a family member, close friend, law enforcement agent, or other trusted individual." 
Id. Courts tend to use this understanding, however, to stretch the time frame of the excited utterance 
exception, not to abandon the construct altogether. 
159. See Hunter, supra note 2, at 147 ("[C]ourts have been reluctant to permit experts to testify 
that a rape complainant suffers from RTS in order to prove nonconsent; such evidence has been 
excluded on the grounds that it is unreliable, prejudicial, or entirely unhelpful to the jury."). 
160. See Etlinger, supra note 152, at 1297-98. As Professor Toni Massaro explains, expert 
testimony concerning the syndrome can educate the jury about the nature of rape and how survivors 
respond to the traumatic event. See Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: 
The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and its Implication for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. 
L. REv. 395, 432-36 (1985); see also Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and 
the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1067 (1991) (advocating 
expanded use of concept of expert RTS testimony to permit introduction of expert testimony 
concerning falsity of rape myths). 
161. Rape Trauma Syndrome has its critics who, with merit, denounce its focus as a medical 
model that pathologizes the reasonable reactions of female victims of sexual violence by labeling 
their behavior as "symptoms" or "syndromes." See Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape 
Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1271 (1994) (arguing that 
women, who have encountered difficulty in being believed by doctors and psychologists, should be 
leery of placing rape in the care of mental health professionals). Stefan makes some excellent 
arguments, particularly in criticizing the medical and social work professions, but she neglects the 
overwhelming feeling of relief that survivors feel when they learn that their experience is normal. 
Although Stefan is correct that it is inappropriate to transform the observations of RTS into to a 
normative requirement, she undervalues its benefits. Despite legitimate concerns, RTS nevertheless 
can serve as an essential tool for feminists; it should not be abandoned. 
Other critics worry about a potential "catch-22": that RTS has merely replaced one set of 
expectations of the "proper" way for a survivor of sexual violence to react with another set of rigid 
expectations. Women can suffer because they don't fit patriarchal presumptions about victims of 
sexual violence, or if they do, then they are suspected of making it all up because they don't fit the 
RTS "requirements." See generally Economu, supra note 153, at 1170-71. Cf Myrna Raeder, The 
Double Edged Sword: Admissibility of Syndrome and Profile Evidence By and Against Batterers in 
Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 COLo. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996). 
Still others doubt the scientific validity of RTS and argue that it should be used solely for healing 
survivors and not for proving guilt or even for vouching for the survivor's reaction as normal. Recent 
psychological literature, however, seems to credit RTS as a reliable description of the experiences of 
many survivors of rape and other sexual violence. See Patricia A. Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Rape 
Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case Law and Psychological Research, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 
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withdrawal and numbness that their reactions are normal. From a legal 
perspective, RTS can be used to educate the jury and, most importantly 
from the perspective of this Article, to inform rule drafters about the 
wide range of possible reactions to a sexual assault. 
C. Social Expectations of a Wronged Woman 
However RTS informs evidence law, we must question why a reac- 
tion to stress that is at odds with women's documented experience is 
nevertheless venerated by evidence law. Part of the answer lies in the 
fact that although the excited utterance does not describe the experience 
of women who have suffered rape or other sexual violence, it does com- 
port with society's expectations of survivors of sexual violence. Doctri- 
nally, there are strong indications that the excited utterance exception 
functions to promote social norms, articulating and enforcing social and 
cultural expectations of how women should react to these traumatic 
events. 
Because of its uninformed and unrealistic doctrinal requirements, 
the excited utterance doctrine reinforces cultural presumptions about 
normalcy that enable society to dismiss women as liars. In requiring an 
excited and near-immediate response from the victim, evidence law im- 
plicitly dismisses those who do not fit the fixed pattern of credibility. 
The structure of the rules insinuates that a reaction to a traumatic event 
that deviates from this prototype marks the declarant as unnatural, 
sneaky, vindictive, or otherwise unreliable. Indeed, the excited utterance 
exception is often justified because it purportedly prevents conniving 
and vindictiveness. 
Studies confirm that survivors of rape and other sexual violence 
behave in ways, described by RTS theory, that seem counterintuitive to 
the average juror.162 The initial quietude-the deadly calm that survi- 
vors may display-conflicts with the cultural construct of the indignant 
respectable woman. As a consequence, survivors of rape and other sex- 
ual violence are often disbelieved because they do not fit the expecta- 
299-300 (1992), cited in Etlinger, supra note 152, at 1297 n.204. Furthermore, ven if the scientific 
evidence is unconvincing to some, the pattern described by RTS from anecdotal clinical observation 
alone provides another different type of "experience" that should co-exist alongside Wigmore's 
expostulation of the experience of stress. 
162. See Stefan, supra note 161, at 1340 n.365 (noting that "if a rape victim is too calm when 
reporting the assault to police, defense counsel will question her veracity or imply that she 
consented"); Torrey, supra note 160, at 1064-65, 1017-31 (reviewing psychological literature and 
summarizing popular perceptions of how rape victims are expected to behave). Studies of jury 
behavior and attitudes reveal poorly disguised hostility toward rape victims, whom juries view as 
assuming the risk of rape "by conduct such as drinking, wearing 'seductive' clothing, or accepting a 
ride with the assailant". Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex": Recognizing 
Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REV. 21, 31 (1994) (quoting DEBORAH L. RHODE, 
JUSTICE AND GENDER 248 (1989)). 
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tion that a sincere woman genuinely wronged would cry out immedi- 
ately.13 
Underlying the notion that an excited cry is inherently credible is 
the assumption that a trustworthy woman would issue an immediate dis- 
tressed cry. This assumption, dating back to Biblical law, distinguished 
the credibility of a victim who was raped in the city from one raped in 
the country. In the populated city, she would not be believed unless 
someone heard her cry out."M The operation of excited utterance mir- 
rors the Biblical standard. Although the contemporary excited utter- 
ance exception has no volume requirement, to qualify under the 
exception, a survivor of rape or other sexual violence must issue an ex- 
cited statement very shortly after the event. 
The requirement of prompt reaction and reporting in the Biblical 
tradition and the excited utterance requirement are particularly unrea- 
sonable in cases involving rape and other sexual violence. Many 
women suffer constraints, psychological and practical, that make it un- 
likely that they will fit the excited utterance paradigm. Survivors of sex- 
ual violence feel shame, face disbelief, and experience a realistic fear of 
rejection as "damaged goods."'165 Additional impediments arise from 
the historical silencing of women as a class and the notion that victims 
of sexual crimes somehow "asked for it," (a mean-spirited conclusion 
that only seems to apply to men when they are in prison). Furthermore, 
RTS research demonstrates that rape and other sexual violence causes 
tremendous internal turmoil and upheaval that lead many women to 
withdraw. 
One indication that the excited utterance is more about social ex- 
pectation and control than about psychology (however misguided) is 
that courts tend to admit out-of-court statements even when much time 
has passed for reflection, if the victim reported at the first real opportu- 
nity.166 In other words, even if the victim already had an opportunity to 
163. Survivors of rape and other sexual violence are overwhelmingly women. Nonetheless, it is 
likely that the excited utterance also misdescribes the experience of men who are victims of sexual 
violence. The focus here, however, is on women, because women's welfare is central to feminism, 
the RTS evidence on which this Article relies was generated from the experience of women. 
Furthermore, all women suffer when an evidence rule serves to discount women's credibility. 
164. See Deuteronomy 22:23-27. 
165. See Ronet Bachman, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Violence Against Women 9 (1994) (discussing 
women's experience of fear and shame leading them to fail to report), cited in Myrna S. Raeder, The 
Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463 
(1996). 
166. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 43 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]ime lapse to be 
considered in [child sexual abuse] cases is not simply the time between the abuse and the declaration. 
Rather, courts must also be cognizant of the child's first real opportunity to report the incident.") 
(citing Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988)); State v. Peite, 839 P.2d 1223, 1230 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (emphasizing that "challenged evidence consisted of the very first statements" 
made by survivor after the rape, and ruling that these statements were admissible even though not 
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calm down and reflect, (hence theoretically vitiating the spontaneity and 
assurance of reliability) her declaration is often nevertheless admissible 
if she reported the rape or other sexual violence as soon as possible. 
This approach echoes the doctrine of prompt complaint'67 and elevates 
the fact of quick report over stress as a guarantee of sincerity. It reflects 
the high value associated with the woman's "proper" response in con- 
formity with the construct of the believable injured woman and rewards 
women for acting in conformity with these social expectations. 
D. Denial and Power 
The observation that the excited utterance rule excludes reliable 
speakers, reinforces social expectations about how women should react 
to rape and other sexual violence, and fuels society's inclination to dis- 
miss women as liars, builds upon a growing body of scholarship con- 
cerning women's experiences in the courtroom. In a recent article, 
Professor Kim Lane Scheppele explores how legal or courtroom 
"truth" is constructed by society to discount the voices of some 
women.168 Scheppele focuses on what she terms the "woman- 
unfriendly habits"'169 of courts in assessing evidence, examining why the 
"stories women tell in court, particularly in cases of sexualized violence 
like rape, sexual harassment, incest, and woman battering, are vulnerable 
to attack as unbelievable."•70 She observes that abused and harassed 
made immediately after the event); cf McGugan v. State, 167 P.2d 76, 79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946) 
(determining victim's failure to complain to driver who picked her up on highway and drove her to 
police station barred admission of victim's later complaint to police). 
Although this willingness to extend the duration of excitement to fit within the excited utterance 
exception could merely reflect a doctrinal confusion with the doctrine of prompt complaint, which 
was admissible to shore up the "prosecutrix's" testimony in a rape case, it more likely reflects the 
deeper cultural assumption common to both doctrines that women, if they aren't liars, will report as 
soon as possible. See Ellis v. State, 6 So. 768, 770 (Fla. 1889) ("The female outraged should seek the 
first opportunity to complain, and the fact that she does complain goes to the jury as evidence ... "). 
167. See infra note 213. 
168. Kim Lane Scheppele, Just The Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and 
the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992). The title of the piece refers to the image of 
Sergeant Joe Friday from the old Dragnet television show--enjoining a hysterical woman to rid 
herself of emotion and describe a story chronologically and dispassionately, sticking to "just the 
facts." 
169. Id. at 125. Professor Scheppele argues that even though the law "pretends to be above 
politics, prejudice, and partiality," it affects women unfairly. Id. at 166. In particular, she targets the 
"preference for first versions of stories," which "looks like a neutral rule" but "falls particularly hard 
on women." Id. at 169. She argues that it is a common phenomenon among women recounting a 
traumatic story for the truth to develop over time, particularly as the women consider and reinterpret 
events. A woman will recover significant memory gaps as she gets stronger. Women who have been 
subject to sexual violence also exhibit symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome which 
"shatter[s] ... their sense of narrative coherence." Id. at 138-39 (citation omitted). On a more 
philosophical plane, Scheppele notes that disbelief of revised stories also indicates our judicial 
approach to truth as "singular, immediately apparent, and permanent." Id. at 127. 
170. Id. at 123. 
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women exhibit many of the characteristics traditionally associated with 
liars-they remain silent for a long time after the abuse, procrastinate in 
reporting the incident, hesitate, change their stories, or sound equivocal 
because of self-blame.171 Scheppele uses the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas 
hearings to demonstrate how delay in reporting hurts women's credibil- 
ity.'• The senators, and even Thomas himself, relied on Hill's delay to 
question her memory, perception, and motives. 
It is illuminating to speculate why courts often see what psycholo- 
gists identify as women's typical reactions to stress and violence as evi- 
dence of lying. Two related theories offer possible explanations. First, 
as Scheppele suggests, the cultural construct of the lying, scheming fe- 
male may be rooted in the psychological defense mechanism of de- 
nial."73 In psychoanalytic terms, denial is a way for the ego to repress 
painful facts and thoughts,174 crowd them out of consciousness, and 
avoid facing them.'75 Denial can happen on an individual level (such as 
an alcoholic who denies having a drinking problem) or can affect an 
entire society (such as German villagers who claimed to be unaware of 
Nazi genocide in nearby concentration camps).176 
171. See id. at 126-27. 
172. As Scheppele notes, there are many explanations for delay in reporting and changes in a 
story. Delay may arise from an attempt to solve, defuse, or negotiate a problem. See id. at 149. 
Once a sexually harassed woman has been fired, she has no further incentive for silence. Her 
"delayed" disclosure is not necessarily prompted by revenge, but by the fact that she has nothing left 
to lose. The issue of the subtle (and not so subtle) expectations we have of how women react to 
stressful situations has been played out in battered woman syndrome as well. See generally 
Mahoney, supra note 5 (comparing the arguments made for disbelieving Hill with traditional ways of 
discrediting women who stay in abusive relationships). Professor Mahoney draws on the rhetoric of 
the Clarence Thomas hearings to critique the ways physically abused women are treated and their 
stories are heard. Like Professor Scheppele, Professor Mahoney examines the hearings and observes 
how women's credibility is measured by a faulty set of assumptions. The battered woman is held to 
account: Why didn't she leave? Why didn't she do something? Or at least say something? The 
presumption is that it could not have been that bad because the woman chose to stay in the 
relationship. Therefore, the woman's account of the battery is discounted. See id. at 1285-87. 
173. See Scheppele, supra note 168, at 138-45 (describing how rape survivors alter their stories 
over time in order to deal with this trauma). 
174. See David S. Caudill, Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contours of a Radical Socio-Legal 
Psychoanalysis, 66 IND. L. J. 651, 658-59 (1991). 
175. See id. at 675 (quoting David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and 
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 607 (1984), who has characterized all legal thought as "a form of 
denial, a way to deal with perceived contradictions that are too painful for us to hold in 
consciousness"); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) (discussing denial of domestic violence and defining 
denial as "a defense mechanism well recognized in psychology that protects people from consciously 
knowing things they cannot bear to reckon with at the time"); see also Christine Adams, Mothers Who 
Fail to Protect Their Children from Sexual Abuse: Addressing the Problem of Denial, 12 YALE L. & 
POL'Y REV. 519, 521 (1994) ("Denial is a psychological defense mechanism that a person uses to 
screen out distressing realities and the painful feelings they cause.") (citing TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 472 (Clayton L. Thomas ed., 16th ed. 1989) (further defining denial)). 
176. See Caudill, supra note 174, at 661 (stating that psychoanalysis "contains the possibilities for 
an approach that analyzes the mechanisms by which the social world enters into the experience of 
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Women's stories of rape and other sexual violence, battery, and 
harassment paint a terrifying portrait of women's everyday lives,177 and 
are often too painful to hear. Rather than believe that women are in 
danger, society looks for psychological comfort by engaging in de- 
nial.'78 The overwhelming brutality and violence against women invites 
society to discredit women who as survivors, litigants, or political activ- 
ists agitate to have their stories heard.179 Society resorts to the more psy- 
chologically reassuring conclusion that the victim must be lying, or at 
least exaggerating.18" 
The process of denial leads to distortion. In order to deny 
women's experiences, we as a society reconceptualize and redefine vio- 
lence against women so that the only "real rapes"'•' are those perpe- 
trated by the relatively unusual scenario of an attacker hiding in the 
bushes,182 and the only real traumas are those that elicit an immediate or 
near-immediate cry.183 By denying the staggering statistics of violence 
each individual, constructing the human 'subject' and reproducing itself through the perpetuation of 
particular patterns of ideology") (quoting S. FROSH, THE POLITICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO FREUDIAN AND POST-FREUDIAN THEORY 40 (1987)). See generally DANIEL 
GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES, SIMPLE TRUTHS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OFSELF-DECEPTION 175-79 (1985). 
177. According to the Surgeon General, violence from men is the single greatest health threat to 
American women. See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 162, at 32 (1994). Data show that women are 
far more likely to be targets of gender-related violence, sexual abuse, or intimidation. See The 
Violence Against Women Act of 1991, S. REP. No. 102-197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 33-34 (1991) 
[hereinafter Violence Against Women Act]; CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 1 (1991); Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, 
Gender, Intimacy, and Lethal Violence: Trends from 1976 Through 1987, 7 GENDER & SOC'Y 78 
(1993). See generally Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277 (1993) 
(claiming that the legal system will not acknowledge the wide variety of circumstances in which 
sexual violations occur); West, supra note 90 (arguing that women experience suffering that men do 
not, and that the legal system trivializes these gender-based sufferings). 
178. See Mahoney, supra note 175, at 3 ("For actors in the courtroom drama, the fiction that 
such violence is exceptional allows denial of the ways in which domestic violence has touched their 
own lives."); Scheppele, supra note 168, at 142. 
179. See Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal 
Perspectives of Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1311 (1993) 
(skepticism of women's stories "is far easier than acceptance of the reality that so many men are so 
dangerous, and that there is little (or nothing) many women can do on their own to be safe"). 
180. Cf. FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES 
IN THE COURTS 24 (1989) (revealing the belief that women lie or exaggerate about domestic 
violence), cited in Hunter, supra note 2, at n.263. 
181. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 1-7 (1987) (describing differential treatment of "real 
rape" and "simple rape" and arguing for a new understanding of rape that "recognizes that a 
'simple' rape is a real rape"). 
182. In fact, most women are raped by people they know. See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 
162, at 30 (citing studies that concluded that 70-80% of rapes are committed by acquaintances of the 
victim). 
183. See Stefan, supra note 161, at 1319-20. This cultural expectation also explains the tendency 
to describe RTS as a psychological adjustment problem, rather than as a natural reaction. See also 
supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text. 
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against women (which is always easy to do),"M and by ignoring the sto- 
ries of individual women (harder, but possible), society is spared the 
pain of empathizing with women and the difficulty of changing behav- 
ior and attitudes. Righteous men are spared facing the fact that they 
may not be able to protect their wives, sisters, daughters, or friends. 
Violent men are spared facing their crimes. Women are spared the re- 
alization of their own vulnerability to rape and other sexual violence. 
Second, in addition to, or perhaps as part of denial, society's re- 
sponse to women survivors of sexual violence is also affected by the 
myopia of power. Functionally, society's construction of women's ex- 
perience serves to reinforce the culture of the dominant group, mirror- 
ing the experience and world view of those in power. Indeed, this focus 
on the power differential between men and women is the hallmark of 
dominance feminism. 
The current construct of a "credible woman" subtly reinforces the 
current power dynamics between the sexes, demanding that female sur- 
vivors of sexual violence display stress in a socially acceptable fashion 
and report the attack (to male authority figures) immediately. Because 
it deviates so markedly from women's reported experiences, this con- 
struct, as a functional matter, perpetuates suspicion of women, feeds so- 
cial denial, and allows violence against women to continue. 
An analysis from a power perspective helps to explain silence and 
delay of victims of rape and other sexual violence.1s5 In addition to the 
184. "A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic." JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR 
QUOTATIONS 766:11 (15th ed. 1980) (attributed to Joseph Stalin). Cf. Weisburd & Levin, supra note 162, at 28 (stating that a vast majority of those who murder women are present or former intimate 
partners). As Professor Deborah Rhode acknowledges, rape may be the most underreported of all 
crimes and "[e]stimates of the percentage [of rapes] reaching police attention range from 5 to 50 
percent, and much appears to depend on how one surveys possible victims." RHODE, supra note 162, 
at 246; see Stefan, supra note 161, at 1281-85 (discussing various methods of measuring rape 
including FBI reports, the National Crime Victimization Survey, and various other surveys). Fear of 
rape dramatically affects women's exercise of their personal and civil rights. As the Report of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on the Violence Against Women Act recently noted, 
[O]ne recent study showed that three-quarters of women never go to the movies alone after 
dark because of the fear of rape and nearly 50 percent do not use public transit alone after 
dark for the same reason. Women accommodate their fears by restricting their behavior. 
Due in large part to the fear of rape, a woman is eight times more likely than a man to avoid 
walking in her own neighborhood after dark. 
Violence Against Women Act, supra note 177, at 38-39. 
185. This focus on power is also supported by linguistic and anthropological studies that indicate 
gender and class differences in courtroom speech patterns. These studies document that women and 
other subordinated groups employ speech patterns and communication strategies that are perceived 
as less credible. See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor 
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 583 (1992) (citing ROBIN LAKOFF, 
LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE (1975)) (discussing "powerless speech"); John M. Conley et al., 
The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L. J. 1375, 1380 (defining 
a powerless speech style and noting that the style is used more frequently by female witnesses); 
Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and "Feminine" 
Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1647-54 (1991) (discussing discourse patterns associated with gender, 
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psychic numbness and self-blame they experience,"' their delay may 
stem in part from powerlessness, and in part from an awareness that their 
claims will not be vindicated or respected. The survivor who becomes 
numb to her terror for weeks after the rape or other sexual violence, 
(much like the wife who remains with her abusive husband"87 or the 
highly placed assistant who tolerates sexual harassment),'18 contrasts 
sharply with the image of the powerful excited utterer perpetuated by 
evidence law. These women do not cry out quickly in excited procla- 
mations; instead they delay making formal reports or even telling any- 
one. Given the structure of evidence law, however, this very response of 
the less powerful further undermines their claims. Consequently, their 
silence and delay discredits them even more. Because of this delay, they 
are perceived as brooding, conniving, and untrustworthy, rather than 
spontaneous, instinctive, and honest; there is little recognition of their 
shame, their fear of making a report, or their need to sort through emo- 
tions and options.'89 
Thus, the excited utterance makes sense only for those who feel 
safe enough to issue a cry of protest, and secure enough that the cry will 
be taken seriously.'90 One can see this as a conspiracy-it certainly has 
effectively squelched women's voices-or one can see it, as this author 
does, as part of the hubris of power. Those who possess power may be 
oblivious to the nature of that power, understanding their elevated status 
as the natural order of things. Like Wigmore, they rely on their own 
experience-and assume its universality. As beneficiaries in the power 
hierarchy, they assume its correctness, fairness, and inevitability. As 
winners, they are not prompted to question whether a style of discourse 
including signs of uncertainty); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making 
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 543 n.35 (1987-88) (citing 
Conley et al., supra). Hallmarks of this powerless speech include tentativeness, hedging, hiding 
statements within questions, and using modifiers that tend to undermine the content of the statement. 
The pattern serves to reinforce the hierarchy of speakers and invites the listener to discount the 
speaker's personal communication and importance. See Bezdek, supra, at 584-85 (citing Lakoff and 
studies by William O'Barr in which jurors asked to assess witnesses' testimony after hearing tapes of 
identical transcripts but in powerful and powerless styles assessed the powerless style speakers as less 
credible). 
186. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 153, at 1067 n.24 (discussing parallels between Post-Traumatic 
Stress Syndrome and RTS); text accompanying notes 151-153. 
187. See generally Mahoney, supra note 175. 
188. See generally Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813 (1991). 
189. Social science research has demonstrated that women's communication styles tend to be 
perceived as less credible generally. See Hunter, supra note 2, at 165 (noting that women's speech 
patterns, "such as 'ums,' rising intonations, and hesitancy, are associated with powerlessness"). 
190. See id. at 127 (emphasizing the themes of admissibility and credibility and arguing that first 
women's stories be allowed into court and that "then [courts] must take these stories seriously"). 
Hunter notes that "[t]here are also good reasons why women may fail to report abuse at the time it 
occurred: they may feel that complaints are hopeless or may be traumatized or intimidated into 
silence." Id. at 160. 
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that works for them may not be universal. This inability to see other 
perspectives (born of the lack of need to do so) is a failure of empa- 
thy.'91 It also reinforces denial. Those who cannot speak in the lan- 
guage of power will not be as readily heard; if stories of rape and other 
sexual violence are not heard, the problem can easily be denied. 
Practically speaking, a powerful person exposed to a great affront 
such as sexual harassment or physical violence would respond decisively 
and without delay. Those in positions of power rail at unjust treatment, 
in part, because they possess the conviction that they deserve better. 
Furthermore, as members of a dominant class, they have a reasonable 
expectation that their rights and concerns will be addressed.'92 Their 
experience in negotiating the legal system and other social institutions 
promotes their confidence that they can redress wrongs perpetrated 
against them. 
Thus, the excited utterance exception may indeed delineate the 
hallmarks of believability in describing the perspective of certain domi- 
nant and powerful speakers. Because they are dominant and have con- 
trol over their lives, such speakers confront few circumstances that 
challenge their worldviews; nothing in their lives has prompted them to 
notice that their experiences are not universal. But it is these very as- 
sumptions of normalcy, objectivity, and universality that feminism 
challenges. 
E. Extending the Excited Utterance Doctrine 
Two points emerge for future consideration. First, although the 
starkest examples of disbelieving women surround rape and other sex- 
ual violence, it would be interesting to apply this analysis to other 
events. One obvious way to extend this analysis is to apply it to other 
areas of law in which women are not believed, and myths of female 
wrongdoing are used to blame the victim, such as domestic battery, sex- 
191. For a wonderful definition and discussion of empathy, see Lynne N. Henderson, Legality 
and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1579-82 (1987) (identifying three aspects of empathy or 
empathic capacity: 1) the capacity to perceive others as sharing one's own goals, interests, and 
feelings; 2) the imaginative xperience of the situation of another; and 3) the response that 
accompanies experiencing another's distress, which may (but not must) lead to action to ease the pain 
of another). 
192. Given this power-based explanation, it is reasonable to believe that women of color, who 
have less power and less claim on the ruling elite, may be doubly disbelieved. Some women of color 
may also be hampered by divided loyalties in issues of gender politics that seem to pit white women 
against African-American men. Recent cases involving allegations of rape or violence against 
famous African-American men (such as Mike Tyson and O.J. Simpson) have pitted allegiance to 
race against allegiance to sisterhood. See Robert Garcia, Rape, Lies and Videotape, 25 Loy. L.A. L 
REV. 711, 721 n.38 (1992) (citing Harris, supra note 93, at 598-601 (1990)) (discussing black 
women's conflict between victimization by rape and empathy for black men who have been 
victimized by society); Valerie Smith, Split Affinities: The Case of Interracial Rape, in CONFLICTS IN 
FEMINISM 271, 278-84 (Marianne Hirsh & Evelyn Keller Fox eds., 1990). 
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ual harassment, and stalking. Indeed, one could postulate that the cri- 
tique could apply to all utterances made by women concerning startling 
events. If the willingness to make a quick, excited declaration reflects a 
typically male conversational style, the excited utterance rule would fail 
to describe the experiences of female witnesses in all types of exciting 
events. 
The problem with this extension of the doctrine, however, is that the 
delay and hesitation produced by some startling events might be less 
pronounced than in cases of sexually related crimes, where a woman 
feels her general powerlessness mixed with the shame associated with 
sexual assault or harassment. Arguably, a woman might fit more closely 
into the "reliable" observer mold delineated by the excited utterance 
exception if she is involved in a traffic accident than if she survives sex- 
ual violence. As a witness to a traffic accident, her status is less subordi- 
nate, her person is not violated, and the woman may feel powerful 
enough to speak in the voice of the empowered. In addition, society's 
psychological need to deny her story is diminished in the case of a traf- 
fic accident, as compared with a tale of sexual violence. 
A second point for further thought involves extending the analysis 
to other groups. If, indeed, the excited utterance exception provides an 
example where the dominant culture misunderstands or ignores the less 
powerful, this feminist critique of the excited utterance exception could 
logically extend to other oppressed groups, such as racial minorities, 
homosexuals, or the poor, whose history of subjugation and cultivation 
of different voices may influence their ability to fit into the evidentiary 
mold of the credible speaker.193 Suspicion of delay is not exclusively a 
problem for women, but may in fact affect anyone who is made to feel 
less powerful through the trauma of violence or unpleasant and unbid- 
den sexual or physical attention. Hence, this part of the critique could 
apply to some male victims of violence or harassment, or any group that 
has less access to and confidence in the justice system. 
Whatever this feminist critique may teach us about communication 
in general, and however it may extend to other groups and other excit- 
ing events, it is clear that evidence law must be modified to address the 
disparity between RTS and the current structure of the excited utterance 
exception. The excited utterance exception disserves the practical needs 
of women by relying on an underinclusive, arguably patriarchal view of 
how people react to the stress of rape or other sexual violence.'94 We 
193. This hypothesis is supported by the research on powerful and powerless speech. See 
White, supra note 185, at 542-44 (discussing the power and perceived credibility of the poor); 
Bezdek, supra note 185 (same). 
194. Others have criticized the exception as over-inclusive in that it admits statements that are 
not necessarily accurate or reliable, see Swift, supra note 130, at 1347-54, but that issue does not 
arise here, except insofar as it adds irony to the exclusion of women's voices. 
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cannot continue to rely on unsound cultural intuitions that reflect 
gendered notions of normalcy and credibility. If the purpose of the 
excited utterance rule is, in fact, to assure credibility, it is essential that 
the law reflect what psychology has told us about the experience of 
women. We must listen to the observations of psychologists and the 
self-reporting of women regarding how survivors of sexual attacks actu- 
ally respond. Furthermore, this call for change does not imply that psy- 
chology or even feminism is fully free of cultural bias and sexism. 
What follows is a proposal that attempts to confront some of the en- 
trenched distrust of women that underlies the evidence rules, and to ad- 
dress problems with the current doctrine, reflecting current knowledge 
about the psychology of survivors of rape and other sexual violence. 
V 
A PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING THE EXCITED UTTERANCE RULE 
AND FOR ESTABLISHING A NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR 
SURVIVORS OF RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
This Article proposes a change in the current excited utterance 
rule'95 and outlines a related new hearsay exception for survivors of 
violent or sexual crimes. The proposed new exception reflects the in- 
sight that because sexual violence derives from power plays by the per- 
petrator and often induces shame on the part of the victim, it is unlikely 
that many survivors, especially women (but not exclusively so), will re- 
port immediately. The admission of such survivors' hearsay statements 
about the rape or other sexual violence, regardless of the timing of the 
report, would render evidence law more inclusive and psychologically 
informed. 
As a doctrinal matter, the proposed changes straddle the division 
between Rule 803 hearsay exceptions, for which the declarant's avail- 
ability is immaterial, and Rule 804 hearsay exceptions, for which the 
declarant must be shown to be unavailable. The revised excited utter- 
ance rule would create a preference for the victim's availability in court, 
but would also admit victims' hearsay statements where the victim was 
proven to be unavailable.'96 The proposed rule reads as follows: 
195. Because the excited utterance exception as it is currently drafted probably does serve some 
speakers and has survived for generations, I am loathe to abandon it entirely. The feminist critique, 
like the psychological one, stems from concerns that the doctrine is flawed and underrepresentative, 
not that it is entirely without value. Instead, my proposal retains the doctrine with modifications that 
acutally increase its fairness to the accused. 
196. Cf. Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 
72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 897, 928-38 (1992) (stressing the importance of making available declarants 
subject to cross-examination and proposing a hearsay rule that would take into acount the 
prosecutor's ability to make declarants available). 
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The following statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is available for cross-examination concerning the 
statement or if the declarant is proven to be unavailable under 
Rule 804(a): 
a) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of ex- 
citement caused by the event or condition. 
b) Sexual violence survivor's statement. A statement concerning 
a sexual assault, made by the survivor concerning the event or its 
effect on the survivor. Where the survivor is unavailable pursu- 
ant to Rule 804(a), the survivor's statement is admissible only if 
the court finds that circumstances surrounding its making indi- 
cate the trustworthiness of the statement. For the purposes of 
this exception, survivor shall mean an adult who has experienced 
sexual assault as defined by Federal law or law of a State (as de- 
fined in section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that in- 
volved- 
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, 
United States Code; 
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defen- 
dant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another 
person; 
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of 
the defendant and any other person's body; 
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction 
of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person; or 
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described 
in paragraphs (1)-(4). 
The victim need not actually be alive or available to qualify 
as a survivor. 
c) Notice to the accused in a criminal case. In a criminal case, 
the prosecutor must give reasonable written notice in advance of 
the trial or hearing, or during trial if the court excuses pre-trial 
notice on good cause shown, of the intention to introduce an ex- 
cited utterance or a survivor's statement. 
A. Doctrinal Changes 
The proposal under subsection (a) differs from the current excited 
utterance in two major respects: availability of the declarant and notice 
to the defendant. Currently, the excited utterance exception, as codified 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, applies whether or not the declar- 
ant is available to testify. Astoundingly, this means that under the cur- 
rent rule the declarant could be sitting in the courtroom and the hearsay 
could nevertheless be used in preference to in-court testimony without 
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any opportunity for the accused to confront the declarant.'7 The pro- 
posed revision to the excited utterance rule allows the opposing party to 
confront and cross-examine the declarant concerning the statement 
whenever the declarant is in fact available. In most cases covered by this 
proposed amendment to the excited utterance, the survivor will testify 
and the criminal defendant will have an opportunity to cross-examine 
the survivor and the testifying witnesses, and will suffer no unfairness.'98 
Furthermore, the criminal defendant will receive notice from the prose- 
cutor pursuant to section (c). From the perspective of a criminal defen- 
dant, this is an improvement over the existing excited utterance rule. 
To offer an excited utterance where the declarant does not testify, 
the prosecution must show that the declarant is unavailable. The stan- 
dard for unavailability is set out in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) and 
includes incompetency and incapacity.'" The most frequent causes of 
declarant's unavailability involve subsequent interference with her abil- 
ity to testify (such as sickness, intimidation, or death), or, in the case of a 
very young child, incompetence to testify. Although there is a strong 
argument that emotional incapacity to face the perpetrator should con- 
stitute unavailability for traumatized adults as well as children, that 
question is best left for another day. If evidence law were to allow an 
adult's unavailability to derive from emotional trauma, the declarant's 
statement would obviously be admissible only upon a particularized 
showing that such testimony would create trauma for the declarant 
197. This is reminiscent of Sir Walter Raleigh's objection that his accuser (whose testimony was 
summarized through affidavit) was "hard by" and should have been made available for questioning. 
1 Knight's Crim. Trials 418 (1932), cited in JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EVIDENCE 83-84 (7th ed. 1992). 
198. Although this is not exactly equivalent to confronting the declarant at the time she makes the 
statement, it is very close, and the Supreme Court has approved such subsequent confrontation where 
the witness takes the stand. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970) (stating that "the 
inability to cross-examine the witness at the time he made his prior statement cannot easily be shown 
to be of crucial significance as long as the defendant is assured of full and effective cross- 
examination at the time of trial"). 
199. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) provides: 
Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the 
declarant- 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning 
the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement 
despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing 
physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure 
the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), 
(3), or (4), the declarant's attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, 
inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a 
statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. 
FED. R. EVID. 804(a). 
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above and beyond the expected distress of testifying about painful, per- 
sonal events.20 
The proposed requirement that the declarant be proven unavailable 
or remain available for cross-examination represents a doctrinal depar- 
ture. Since its inception, the excited utterance exception has not consid- 
ered the declarant's availability. The theory behind this notion that the 
excited declarant's availability is immaterial stems from the belief that 
the declarant can offer no additional insight that would be more valu- 
able to the factfinder than the excited, on-the-spot declaration. By the 
time of trial, he would be calm, and the testimony of an unexcited live 
witness is deemed less accurate than the out-of-court excited utterance 
by the same individual. 
This approach, however, not only calls into question the entire 
premise of the hearsay rule, but it ignores entirely the value of cross- 
examination. Despite the inability to replicate the on-the-spot excite- 
ment (assuming for the sake of argument that the excitement does in- 
deed enhance trustworthiness), cross-examination would be useful to 
examine important underlying facts. Cross-examination would explore 
the declarant's excited state, vantage point, ability to perceive events, or 
possible bias.20' Thus, this proposal, which expresses a preference for 
cross-examination where possible, responds to longstanding criticism of 
the excited utterance doctrine and injects some good sense and fairness 
into the rule.202 As a practical matter, the proposal will probably not cre- 
ate a substantial change from current custom. Good trial tactics often 
dictate a preference for live testimony to buttress out-of-court state- 
ments, most available adult declarants do testify. 
B. The Survivor's Statement 
Section (b) of the proposed hearsay exception, by far the greater 
innovation, applies specifically to survivors of rape and other sexual 
crimes. Most notably, it eliminates all timing requirements. Any state- 
ment, no matter how long after the incident, qualifies as a survivor's 
statement under the proposal if it is made by the survivor and relates to 
rape or other sexual violence. Such survivor's statements are admissible 
200. Cf Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (allowing children to testify by closed-circuit 
television rather than personally confront he defendant if particularized showing is made that the 
child-witness would experience trauma from face-to-face confrontation with accused). 
201. These foundation facts enable the trier of fact to evaluate a declarant's reliability. See 
Swift, supra note 130, at 1356-61. 
202. In fact, this formulation reflects the request of the petitioner in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346 (1992), who argued that "the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires that... the 
prosecution must either produce the declarant at trial or the trial court must find that the declarant is 
unavailable." Id. at 348-49; see also Seigel, supra note 196 (emphasizing the importance of 
subjecting available witnesses to cross-examination). 
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for the truth of the matters asserted.2t" They may be offered by the de- 
clarant or by others such as rape counselors and friends, who will testify 
as to what the survivor said concerning the rape or other sexual vio- 
lence. This new exception eliminates the doctrinal confusion and in- 
consistency surrounding length of delay under the current excited 
utterance rule. 
More importantly, it remedies a fundamental, substantive flaw in 
the excited utterance doctrine. The idea of an excited utterance fails to 
portray accurately a response to stress that is common to survivors of 
sexual violence. The proposal addresses this problem by admitting sur- 
vivors' utterances even when they were made significantly after the 
traumatic event. This recognition that many such survivors delay in re- 
porting the traumatic event comports with not only RTS, but also with 
the more general (and gender-neutral) tenets of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Syndrome, upon which RTS is based. 
Additionally, the proposed rule does not require that the survivor's 
state of nervous excitement or shock be proved by independent evi- 
dence.204 Rape and other sexual violence is stressful enough to qualify 
without any outward manifestation of nervousness (which according to 
RTS may be lacking). By focusing on sexual violence, the proposal 
addresses another doctrinal problem, by reducing the need for judicial 
determination of whether an event qualifies as "exciting." The excep- 
tion as proposed could also apply to civil cases (such as where a woman 
who was raped sues her attacker in tort) but was designed primarily with 
criminal cases in mind. 
The survivor's exception could be adopted without undue hardship 
on criminal defendants; it nevertheless presents tricky Sixth Amendment 
issues. Like the proposed revised excited utterance rule, the exception 
203. The newly proposed Rule does not limit the use of the survivor's out-of-court statement to 
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation, a traditional vehicle for admitting a rape survivor's out-of-court 
statements, allows prosecutors to use rape survivors' out-of-court statements to rehabilitate their 
credibility only if the honesty or veracity of the rape survivor is challenged by the defendant, 
something smart defendants avoid doing. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (limiting admission of prior 
consistent statements by witnesses "to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive"). See generally Christine Kenmore, The 
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Rape Complaints, 64 B.U. L. REV. 199, 211-15 (1984). 
204. Obviously, the trial judge must make a preliminary determination that a triggering violent or 
sexual event occurred. See FED. R. EVID. 104. The judge need not, however, seek evidence 
independent of the survivor's statement to make that determination. See Bourjaily v. United States, 
483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987) (noting that "no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the 
evidence 'falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception"') (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 
(1980)). Nonetheless, one of the ways that rape victims were traditionally excluded from the excited 
utterance exception was this requirement of independent evidence of excitement. Wigmore in 
particular cautioned that rape itself should not be used as evidence of excitement, and independent 
evidence of stress must be brought in order for a woman's statement to qualify as an excited 
utterance. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1753. 
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requires the declarant either to testify or to be proven unavailable. 
Where the declarant-survivor testifies, no objection concerning the de- 
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation arises. Furthermore, 
the notice requirement protects against any last-minute surprises for the 
accused.205 Where the declarant is unavailable, however, a Sixth 
Amendment confrontation problem arises, because by definition this 
new proposal is not "firmly rooted." This triggers a need for the Court 
to seek "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"206 to satisfy the 
Sixth Amendment standard. The trustworthiness requirement in the 
proposal reflects that constitutional concern. 
The trustworthiness requirement also, unfortunately, echoes some 
retrograde "corroboration" requirements, inviting the accused to attack 
the survivor's credibility and the judge to weigh the survivor's believ- 
ability. One can imagine a situation where an unenlightened judge ap- 
plies the very suspect considerations the proposal was meant to counter: 
concerns about delay, suspicions about calm demeanor, and general 
mistrust of women. The trustworthiness finding is necessary, however, 
given the current state of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.207 Therefore, 
educating judges about the reasons for a survivor's statement-i.e., that 
survivors of rape and other sexual violence do not necessarily behave 
according to the cultural model of the credible witness-becomes a cru- 
cial task. Judges must be educated about RTS, but not use it as an ab- 
solute measure of credibility. Rather, they need to be educated about 
the effects of traumatic stress and RTS and the potential for gender bias 
in fact-finding generally. 
This proposal focuses on rape and other sexual violence because 
most of this Article's discussion of the difference and dominance voices 
relies on legal and psychological scholarship concerning rape. The Ar- 
ticle has relied extensively on RTS for the proposition that the voices 
and style of communication of women who have experienced sexual 
violence differ from social expectations. Another benefit of focusing 
on sexual violence is that there is already a trend in evidence law treat- 
ing rape and other sexual violence differently from other crimes. One 
example is the rape shield law; another much more controversial exam- 
ple is the new Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which routinely admits 
evidence of the accused's similar prior acts in rape cases.208 Further- 
205. This notice requirement mirrors the recent amendment to Rule 404(b) and the notice 
requirement in the residual hearsay exception 803(24). See FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 803(24). 
206. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990) (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65). 
207. Thanks to Myrna Raeder for pointing this out. See Raeder, supra note 165 (delineating a 
Domestic Homicide Hearsay Exception and requiring that "the circumstances surrounding its making 
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement"). 
208. See Aviva Orenstein, A Feminist Critique of Character Evidence and New Rule 413 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with California Law Review). 
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more, in the tradition of the evidence rules, the proposal is gender neu- 
tral. Rape Trauma Syndrome is based on Post-Traumatic Stress Syn- 
drome generally, and there is reason to believe that men experience rape 
and other sexual violence as traumatic and may, because of shame, ex- 
hibit many of the less powerful speaking styles associated with 
women.209 
It is fruitful to think about how the proposal might be expanded to 
include other types of intrusive and domineering behavior. The exten- 
sion could include stalking, sexual harassment, and other wrongful con- 
duct that induce fear, shame, or post-traumatic stress. More research on 
the effects of these behaviors and some experience with the rule as more 
narrowly proposed will inform any future attempts to expand the survi- 
vor' s exception. 
A concern raised by any new exception to the hearsay rule is the 
effect that it will have on the conduct of a trial. One function of the 
hearsay rule is to diminish the amount of evidence presented and make 
trials manageable. What will happen to the length and confusion of a 
trial if every out-of-court statement made by a rape or other sexual vio- 
lence survivor comes in? The solution to this administrative problem 
lies in Rule 403, which allows a trial judge to exclude evidence because 
of "waste of time" or "needless presentation of cumulative evi- 
dence."210 Statements by the rape or other sexual violence survivor that 
are merely cumulative are probably excludable under Rule 403, al- 
209. The effects of sexual assault on male survivors are traumatic, and may be quite similar to 
women's documented reactions to sexual assualt, including shame and denial. See Stuart Turner, 
Surviving Sexual Assault and Sexual Torture, in GILLIAN C. MEZEY AND MICHAEL B. KING, MALE 
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 75 (1992) (arguing that men are likely to engage in the avoidance and 
denial behavior associated with post-traumatic stress disorder because of their failure to repel their 
attackers, and because the association of male rape with homosexualtiy and AIDS is too shameful to 
reveal); Gillian C. Mezey, Treatment of Male Victims of Rape, in id. at 131 (arguing that there is little 
evidence suggesting that men and women react to sexual assault differently, although some studies 
have shown that women are more anxious and willing to receive help, and men are more likely to 
externalize their anger and behave belligerently in the long term); Arthur Kaufman, et al., Male Rape 
Victims: Noninstitutionalized Assault, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 221 (1980) (comparing 14 male victims 
with 100 female rape victims and finding that the men were more physically traumatized and were 
more likely to engage in denial to control their emotions, and less likely to reveal their assaults than 
the women studied). 
210. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative vidence. 
FED. R. EvID. 403. The advisory committee note explains that Rule 403 covers 
risks which range all the way from inducing decision on a purely emotional basis, at one 
extreme, to nothing more harmful than merely wasting time, at the other extreme. Situations 
in this area call for balancing the probative value of and need for the evidence against the 
harm likely to result from its admission. 
FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note. 
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though the possibility that a survivor's additional declarations would not 
affect credibility seems unlikely unless they were truly numerous and 
entirely redundant.21' Alternatively, a judge might exclude a survivor's 
statement if there is reasonable concern that the jury would confuse 
various out-of-court statements with live testimony or other admissible 
statements. This too seems unlikely, given the fact that the survivor will 
be available to take the stand and the jury will readily be able to distin- 
guish what the survivor currently testifies to and former out-of-court 
statements.212 The potential for unfair prejudice seems greatest where 
the declarant is unavailable. The added trustworthiness requirement ad- 
dresses this concern. 
Finally, it is important to note that these proposed reforms are more 
than just a revival of the prompt complaint doctrine adorned in feminist 
garb.213 The proposed survivor's statement exception differs from the 
prompt complaint in four significant ways. First and most obviously, it 
211. Commentators warn against over-extension of the "waste of time" prong, which is "a 
concession to the shortness of life," according to Justice Holmes in Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 
944 (Mass. 1887); see MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, 
? 5211. 
212. Some courts, in debating whether to admit the substance of a rape survivor's prompt 
complaint, have expressed concern that "repeated iteration" of the survivor's complaint might 
artificially magnify the evidence and bolster the survivor's testimony unfairly. See State v. Troupe, 
677 A.2d 917, 928 (Conn. 1996). The fear is that in reaffirming the admissibility of prompt 
complaints for the substance as well as the fact of the complaint, the repetitive testimony of various 
witnesses about the complaints would "lend undue credibility" to the survivor's testimony. 
Commonwealth v. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672, 675 (Mass. 1992). Obviously, this Article asserts that, 
given the suspicion against women and the denial of rape, there is little chance that evidence of a 
survivor's statement will overwhelm the jury. Furthermore, any danger of unfair prejudice or 
confusion could be handled best by Rule 403. Therefore, admitting the substance of the surivivor's 
statement is the better result. 
213. In fact, many courts have struggled with the prompt complaint doctrine, recognizing that the 
notion that a woman will immediately complain is antiquated, sexist, and empirically wrong. See, e.g., 
People v. Brown, 883 P.2d. 949, 956 (Cal. 1994) ("The overwhelming body of current empirical 
studies, data, and other information establishes that it is not inherently 'natural' for the victim to 
confide in someone or to disclose, immediately following commision of the offense, that he or she 
was sexually assulated."); Licata, 591 N.E.2d at 674 ("We strongly disagree with the notion that a 
rape victim naturally will complain of an attack soon after it occurs."); State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 
377 (N.J. 1990) (describing the prompt complaint rule as a necessary evil that "serves to neutralize 
the sexist expectations of some jurors that the woman should have complained after having been 
raped"). 
Ultimately, the benefits of admitting prompt complaints trump some courts' unwillingness to 
endorse the stereotypes underlying the prompt complaint doctrine. In Troupe, for example, the court 
criticized the prompt complaint doctrine for its assumption that "any 'normal' woman would report a 
rape soon after its occurrence." 677 A.2d at 924 (quoting State v. Kendricks, 891 S.W.2d 597, 601 
(Tenn. 1994)). It nonetheless opined that the presumptions underlying the prompt complaint doctrine 
still hold sway with jurors, as failure to report still "casts doubt on the credibility of the accusation." 
Id. at 927. Troupe also illustrates the need for a survivor's exception to the excited utterance rule. 
After an angst-ridden discussion in that case, the Supreme Court of Connecticut scaled-back its policy 
of allowing substantive use of a prior statement by a rape survivor and reverted to a rule allowing 
only testimony as to the fact of the complaint. Id. at 923-28. 
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eliminates the "promptness" requirement. Learning from RTS that 
delay in reporting rape and other sexual violence is a normal reaction, it 
does not require an immediate, first opportunity, or even prompt report. 
Second, the substance of the survivor's statement is admissible for its 
truth, unlike a prompt complaint, which is only admissible for the fact 
that a complaint was made.2"4 Third, the proposed survivor's exception 
is born out of feminist concern for how women are treated in the court- 
room, unlike the prompt complaint requirement, which is rooted in 
mistrust of women. Rather than perpetuate the notion of an immediate 
cry (with the ironic twist that the rule of prompt complaint is often per- 
ceived to provide a special advantage for women), the proposed survi- 
vor's exception actually reflects what we know about how people react 
to the trauma of sexual attack. Finally, the proposal extends its reach in 
a gender-neutral fashion, including all who have suffered a violent or 
sexual crime. 
C. The Practical Effect of the Survivor's Statement 
From a feminist perspective, the greatest concern must surround the 
proposal's practical effect on the lives of women who report crimes of 
sex and violence. The history of feminist jurisprudence demonstrates 
that well-intentioned reforms, born of feminist theory, can sometimes 
make women's lives harder.215 At first blush one might wonder whether 
the new proposal, which requires available declarants to be subject to 
cross-examination, might not impose additional hardship, as compared 
to the current excited utterance, which holds the declarant's availability 
immaterial. 
First, because many survivor statements do not fit the current ex- 
cited utterance exception, many women have lost nothing. Furthermore, 
as a practical matter, it is hard to imagine a prosecution for rape or any 
other violent or sexual crime where a survivor, available to testify, would 
not be called. Certainly the case law involving excited utterances made 
by survivors of rape and other sexual violence indicates that survivors' 
extra-judicial statements are generally introduced to supplement the 
survivors' in-court testimony, not to replace it.216 Finally, and most 
214. See State v. Grady 183 N.W.2d 707, 715-18 (Iowa 1971) (distinguishing prompt complaint 
from excited utterance); State v. Bray, 594 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (same). 
215. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC 
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 17-75 (1991) (discussing the negative effects that notions of 
gender neutrality and equality have had on women's property distributions in divorces, such as under 
no-fault schemes). 
216. My review of the cases indicates that where available, the declarant rape survivor usually 
testifies. See, e.g., United States v. Dia, No. 93-10592 (9th Cir. 1994) (mem. op.) (citing the "victim's 
highly credible testimony" and allowing statements made to her roommate under the excited 
utterance exception); Hacker v. Armontrout, No. 90-0246-CV-W-3, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17454 
(1990) (habeas petition challenging admission of survivor's testimony regarding statements he made 
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problematic from a confrontation perspective, the proposal allows for 
the possibility that because of injury, intimidation, or emotional trauma 
the survivor will be deemed unavailable to testify. If such unavailability 
is proved, the survivor's statement may be admitted as substantive evi- 
dence even though the declarant will not be cross examined concerning 
the statement. 
A concern exists about how these proposals will affect young chil- 
dren who are victims of sexual assault and for whom the excited utter- 
ance has up until now served as a flexible means of admitting extra- 
judicial statements to parents, counselors, and doctors. Indeed, the most 
frequent scenario where the survivor does not testify involves a child- 
victim. The pattern involves very young children who are deemed by 
virtue of their age, emotional state, or communication skills to be unable 
to testify, but whose statements to parents or other supervisory adults are 
crucial to the case. The proposed survivor's exception would probably 
serve children well, particularly those deemed unavailable to testify. 
Children certainly do not seem to fit the pattern of the excited cry, par- 
ticularly when they know the abuser. They may not fully comprehend 
the inappropriateness of sexual contact, or may fear reprisal.217 The 
need for hearsay in cases involving children who survive abuse is often 
during the rape); Harmon v. Anderson, 495 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (rape victim's testimony 
supplemented by evidence of excited statement she made to parties from whom she sought help 
immediately after the rape). It is not always clear from an opinion whether the declarant of an 
excited utterance was subject to cross examination at trial. Where the record is clear that an adult 
rape survivor did not testify, the main reason for failure of the survivor to testify is that she did not 
survive. See, e.g., United States v. Hartmann, 958 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1992); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 
390, 392 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Valentzas, 1993 WL 37339 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 5, 1993); Sklar 
v. Ryan, 752 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
Sometimes problems arise with the in-court testimony. See, e.g., Stephens v. California, No. C- 
92-20204 RMW, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10727 (victim testified to memory loss because of alcohol 
induced blackout and stated that she did not want to testify against a family member). Occasionally, 
the testimony is vital because the witness, though physically available, will not be of much use to the 
prosecution. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mass, No. 94-35220, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25499 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(mem. op.) (allowing excited utterance of rape victim reported by witnesses where victim was 
incarcerated in mental hospital for severe psychosis at time of trial); People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
846 (1994) (admitting excited utterance to daughter and neighbors where victim, an elderly woman, 
suffered totally debilitating stroke after attempted rape). Occasionally, a rape survivor's excited 
utterance is used when the woman recants her testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Haner, FR074- 
48-8033, 1996 WL 520968 (A.F.Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 8. 1996) (conviction upheld where wife's 
excited utterance admitted to prove rape despite her testimony that husband engaged in consensual 
sadomasochistic sex). 
By contrast, in cases involving children, the main reason for lack of cross examination was the 
children's incompetence. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (four-year-old who was 
sexually assaulted and experienced emotional difficulty left court without testifying); Byrd v. 
Blodgett, 985 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision); Gregory v. State, 900 F.2d 705, 
705 n.l (4th Cir. 1990) (trial court found child "could not intelligibly express what had happened"). 
217. See Cynthia J. Hennings, Accommodating Child Abuse Victims: Special Hearsay Exceptions 
in Sexual Offense Prosecutions, 16 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 663, 670-71 (1989) (discussing the need to 
protect victims of child abuse from courtroom trauma). 
222 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:159 
acute because the child is so frightened and reluctant to testify that in- 
court testimony seems false or coached, whereas the out-of-court, mat- 
ter-of-fact statement by the child has the ring of truth.218 
This proposal would also address much of the criticism that courts 
extend the excited utterance exception inappropriately, stretching the 
doctrine beyond recognition in cases involving child victims. Children 
raise many special issues,219 and this Article will forgo the "lifeboat syn- 
drome" of lumping women and children together. It is undeniable that 
children receive special treatment, and most would agree that they de- 
serve it, but more study of children's reaction to violence, particularly 
sexualized violence, is necessary to draw any firm conclusions on the 
point. 
CONCLUSION 
The feminist critique presented here, an amalgam of difference and 
dominance feminism, argues that the current excited utterance doctrine 
is underinclusive and relies on narrow and unconsciously gendered no- 
tions of how normal, honest people react to stress. In particular, the ex- 
cited utterance exception subtly undermines women's credibility by 
endorsing social expectations and perpetuating legal and cultural norms 
that conflict with the experiences of survivors of sexual violence. Fur- 
thermore, the excited utterance's construct of how trustworthy people 
behave under stress perpetuates stereotypes that allow society to dis- 
credit women and to deny the pervasiveness of rape and other sexual 
violence in our society. 
This Article proposes a new survivor's exception tailored to victims 
of rape and other sexual violence that reflects the experiences of sexual 
violence survivors and applies to survivors of rape and other sexual vio- 
lence without regard to gender. It attempts to respond to the feminist 
challenge without compromising the rights of criminal defendants, and 
therefore proposes the increased safeguards of notice, a preference for 
in-court testimony to maintain the rights of the accused, and, where the 
survivor is unavailable, a requirement that the circumstances surround- 
218. Compare Jackson v. State, 720 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Ark. 1986) (the in-court "testimony of the 
victim and her little brother was interspersed with agonizing pauses. It may be the most extreme case 
of witness reluctance and leading we have seen."), with State v. Johnson, 639 P.2d 1332, 1333 
(Wash. 1982) (describing an out-of-court casual conversation where a young girl asked her father if 
milk comes out of a penis. She testified at trial "that defendant told her it was 'milk' that 'came out of 
the penis,' but she didn't think so 'cause it tasted yucky'") overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Calle, 888 P.2d 155 (Wash. 1995) (en banc). 
219. Courts have acknowledged the special issues children raise both in their very flexible 
applications of excited utterance and in their adoption of special rules for testimony and children's 
hearsay. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (explaining how court can deem sympathetic 
children "excited" for weeks to satisfy the doctrinal requirements of the excited utterance). 
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ing the out-of-court statement provide a particularized guarantee of 
trustworthiness. 
The analysis invites further exploration of how other disempowered 
groups (particularly children, the poor, and minority group members of 
both sexes) react to stress and how, in turn, society perceives their credi- 
bility. Additionally, it raises the question of whether the proposed sur- 
vivor's exception should be expanded to include other crimes besides 
sexual violence, such as domestic violence, sexual harassment, and 
stalking.220 Finally, this piece invites further feminist analysis of evi- 
dence generally, including how the hearsay rule reinforces gender, race, 
or class discrimination. The assessment of the hearsay rules as rigid, 
acontextual, and hierarchical must be balanced against the rights of 
criminal defendants and the practicalities of trial procedure. Achieving 
an appropriate balance between recognizing the experience of survivors 
and the rights of criminal defendants, and translating that balance into 
workable doctrine, present exciting challenges for future scholarship. 
220. See Joan M. Schroeder, Using Battered Women Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution of A 
Batterer, 76 IOWA L. REv. 553 (1991) (arguing that battered women display many of the same 
behaviors as rape victims). See generally Mahoney, supra note 175 (discussing the myths and 
cultural stereotypes surrounding battered women). 
